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A TURN FOR THE WORSE: FOREIGN 
RELATIONS, CORPORATE HUMAN RIGHTS 
ABUSE, AND THE COURTS 
MICHAEL]' O'DONNELL * 
Abstract: This Note examines recent interventions in corporate human 
rights lawsuits by the executive branch from both legal and political per-
spectives. It first identifies a nascent trend in human rights litigation in 
U.S. courts-namely, the propensity of the Bush administration to inter-
vene on behalf of corporate defendants accused of violating human rights 
in the developing world-by examining the factual and procedural his-
tory of three contemporary lawsuits. It then explores the role of the 
political question, act of state, and international comity doctrines in these 
and similar suits, and advances a method for applying all three doctrines 
in a "human rights-friendly" manner. Finally, the Note examines the Bush 
administration's interventions from a human rights policy perspective 
and concludes that for political, in addition to legal reasons, the executive 
branch should desist from intervening on behalf of corporate defendants 
in human rights lawsuits. 
INTRODUCTION 
In Jul), of 2002, the Legal Achiser to the United States Department 
of State took the unusual step of writing a letter to a presiding judge to 
argue that a case should be dismissed because acljudication could ad-
versely affect U.S. foreign relations. l The United States District Court 
for the District of Columbia, upon Defendant Exxon Mobil's request, 
had sought the State Department's opinion as a possible justification 
for dismissal in a case involving corporate human rights abuse in Illdo-
* Editor in Chief, BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAW JOURNAL (2003-2004). Thanks 
to 'Vasana Punyasena, Erin Han.John Gordon, and Professor David Wirth for their helpful 
suggestions at various stages of this paper. This paper is dedicated to my wife and partner, 
I\lary. 
1 Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 01-CV-1357 (D.D.C. filed June 19, 2001); Letter 
from 'William H. Taft, IV, Legal Adviser to the U.S. Department of State, to Hon. Louis P. 
Oberdorfer, Judge, U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, at 2 (july 29, 2002) 
[hereinafter Exxon Letter], available at http://www.laborrights.org (last visited Nov. 10, 
2003). 
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nesia.2 At issue was whether the court, by adjudicating the claims of In-
donesian nationals who allegedly suffered murder, rape, and torture at 
the hands of Exxon's security guards in war-torn Aceh province, would 
offend Indonesia's government, damaging U.S.-Indonesia relations.3 At 
the time of this writing, the motion to dismiss is pending .. ! 
Doe v. Exxon Mobil CO/po is the most striking example of a nascent 
trend in corporate human rights litigation in the United States.5 Cor-
porate defendants, who have a number of procedural tools at their 
disposal in mass tort cases involving A.merican statutes sHch as the 
Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA), Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA) , 
and Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations statute (RICO), 
have increasingly invoked foreign relations as a defense to adverse 
human rights claims.6 Their arguments have been buttressed in sev-
eral cases by letters and amicus curiae briefs by executive branch 
officials, in which the government argues that the cases should be 
dismissed because of their potential to create difficulties in America's 
foreign relations.7 
The legal basis for dismissal in these cases is often provided by 
the political question, act of state, and international comity doctrines, 
which are rooted in principles of separation of powers, prudence, 
constitutional considerations, and diplomatic sensitivity.8 The use of 
2 Kenneth Roth, U.s. Hypocrisy in Indonesia, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Aug. 14, 2002, at 4. 
3Id. 
• Civil Docket, Exxon (No. 01-CV-1357). 
5 See Peter Waldman & Timothy Mapes, .1.dministration Sets New Hurdles for Hu man Rights 
Cases, WALL ST. j., Aug. 7, 2002, at Bl (,The growing movement to make multinational 
companies liable in U.S. courts for alleged human-rights abuses committed abroad has hit 
a snag-the Bush administration."). 
6 Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.c. § 1961 (1994); Alien 
Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1993); Torture Victim Protection Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 
note (1993). Although the use of the Alien Tort Claims Act in human rights litigation has 
been persistently derided by corporate defendants, Congress explicitly re-affirmed the 
importance of the statu te in 1991, referring to it as a parallel remedy to the Torture Victim 
Protection Act. H.R. REP. No. 102-367(1), at 4 (1991), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 84. 
7 See Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1180 (C.D. Cal. 2002); Brieffor the 
United States as Amicus Curiae, Doe v. Unocal Corp., 2002 WL 31063976 (9th Cir. 2002), 
reit g' en banc granted and opinion vacated, 2003 \'VL 359787, at *1 (9th Cir. 2003) (Nos. 00-
56603,00-56608) [hereinafter Unocal Brief]; Exxon Letter, supra note 1, at 1. 
8 See Unocal, 2002 WL 31063976, at *20; SaTe;, 221 F. Supp.2d at 1183, 1193, 1199; 
Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 31, 35, Exxon 
(No. 01-CV-1357) [hereinafter Plaintiffs' lvIemo]. In several recent letters to courts, the 
Bush administration has refrained from addressing the legal merits of the cases, or the 
legal bases for dismissal, instead offering its views only on the foreign policy ramifications 
of adjudication. See Exxon Letter, supra note 1, at 1; Letter from William H. Taft, lV, Legal 
Adviser to the U.S. Department of State, to Hon. Robert D. l\IcCallul1l, Assistant Attorney 
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these doctrines by corporate defendants is not a noyel basis for de-
fending adyerse daims,9 The Bush administration, however, has 
obliged corporate defendants' requests for intervention to a greater 
extent than preyious administrations, arguing that marginal U.S. in-
terests, such as the fragility of an implausible indigenous peace proc-
ess, or self-serving interests, such as maintaining a robust investment 
climate for U.S. businesses, should outweigh the resolution of human 
rights disputes. to In an era in which corporate human rights litigation 
in the United States is experiencing a dramatic boom, this new obsta-
cle presents a substantial threat to human rights plaintiffs. ll 
Commentators haye proffered yarious solutions to the challenges 
presented by the political question, act of state, and international 
comity doctrines in human rights litigation. Some have proposed do-
mestic legislation that would respond to the limited scope, in the case 
of the TVPA, or the arguable unsuitability, in the case of the ATCA, of 
U.S. statutes that are currently used to hold multinational corpora-
tions (MNCs) liable in U.S. courtS.12 Others have advanced the idea of 
a human rights exception to particular judicial doctrines because of 
General, at 1 (Oct. 31, 2001) [hereinafter Sarei Letter], available at http://www.state.gov/ 
documents/organization/16529.pdf (last yisited Aug. 22, 2003). 
9 See generally First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972); 
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U,S. 398 (1964). These cases involved the ex-
propriation of U.S. businesses' assets by the government of Cuba. See First Na!'l City, 406 
U.S. at 759-60; Sabbatillo, 376 U.S. at 398-400. Not only do they proyide an important early 
example of the act of state doctrine in litigation involving corporations and foreign sover-
eigns, they also illustrate the significant power the State Department wields in influencing 
whether a lawsuit with diplomatic undertones will be dismissed. See Sabbatino. 376 U.S. at 
407, 420. First National City was a veritable ping-pong of dismissals and reversals that 
tracked the State Department's changing opinion of the impact of adjudication on foreign 
relations as the case made its way through the courts. See Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Act of State 
and Department of State: First National Cit)' Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 66 ~I.J. INT't 
L. 795, 796-801 (1972) (recounting the case's procedural history); see also note 235, infra. 
10 See Sarci, 221 F. Supp. 2d. at 1181; Exxon Letter, supra note 1, at 2. The Bush admini-
stration's interventions against human rights plaintiffs have not been limited to corporate 
defendants; the administration has also intervened in suits on behalf of the political lead-
ers of states with poor human rights records. See Oscar Avila, Falun Gong Face 2 Foes: U.S., 
China, CHI. TRIB.,June 23, 2003, at 10 (describing the Justice Department's efforts to dis-
miss a lawsuit filed against former Chinese President Jiang Zemin and other Chinese 
officials for human rights abuses); Joel !\[owbray, Mistrial: AmClica Defends Robert 1I1ugabe, 
NEW REPUBLIC, July 28 & Aug. 3, 2003, at 13 (discussing the State Department's actions 
opposing a suit against Zimbabwe's president, Robert Mugabe, and his ZANU-PF Party 
under the Torture Victim Protection Act). 
11 See David Corn, C011JorateHu1IIanRights. NATION, July 15, 2002, at 31. 
12 See. e.g., Logan lvlichael Breed, Note, Regulating Our 21st-Century Ambassadors: A New 
Approach to COlpomte Liabilit)1 for Human Rights Violations A.broad, 42 VA. J. INT't L. 1005, 
1028 (2002). 
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the importance of accountability for rights abuse. 13 On the specific 
problem of the Bush administration's interventions in recent human 
rights lawsuits, one commentator has recently argued that judges, 
when presented with a recommendation of dismissal by the executive 
branch, should assert their independence and refuse to dismiss llll-
man rights lawsuits,14 
This Note takes a different approach, proposing a two-pronged 
solution to the developing trend, which is referred to below as cxccu-
tivc-c01poratc Collllsion. 15 It first suggests technical methods for applying 
the judicial doctrines in a manner that is more consistent with their 
language and purpose, and more amenable to human rights plain-
tiffs. It then offers a policy critique of executive intervention in dip-
lomatically-sensitive human rights lawsuits, arguing that executive-
corporate collusion is a public policy of dubious merit that represents 
a fickle commitment to human rights values. Thus, in the legal sense, 
when the executive branch intervenes on behalf of defendants in 
human rights lawsuits, the judicial doctrines do not necessarily offer 
easy bases for dismissal; upon examination, they are more "human 
rights-friendly" than the Bush administration might hope. In the pol-
icy sense, there is a solution to executive-corporate collusion that 
largely avoids the separations of powers issues that ordinarily perme-
ate discussions of political questions, acts of state, and international 
comity: Lawyers and human rights advocates should pressure the ex-
ecutive branch not to intervene in the first place. 
Part I of this Note explores the political question, act of state, and 
international comity doctrines individually, briefly recounting their his-
tory, current status, and mode of application in courts. Part II identifies 
13 See, e.g., Rebecca A. Fleming, Comment, Holding State Sovereigns Accountable for Hu-
man Rights Violations: A.pplying the ilct of State Doct/ine Consistently with International Law, 23 
MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 187, 207 (1999) (arguing that the act of state doctrine should be 
modified when its application would frustrate human rights plaintiffs); Sung Teak Kim, 
Note, Adjudicating \'iolations of International Law: Defining the Scope of JlI risdiction Under the 
Alien Tort Statute-Trajano v. Marcos, 27 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 387, 413 (1994) (arguing that 
international comity should not apply to Alien Tort Claims Act cases); Nancy S. Williams, 
Comment, Political Question or Judicial Query: An Examination of the j\Iodcrn Doctrine mid Its 
Inapplicability to Human Rights Mass Tort Litigation, 28 PEPP. L. RI:V. 849, 865-74 (2001) 
(arguing that the political question doctrine should not apply to human rights cases). 
14 Brian C. Free, Comment, A.waiting Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp.: A.dvocating the Cautiolts 
Use of Executive Opinions in Alien Tort Claims Act Litigation, 12 PAC. RIM L. & POL'y J. 467, 
483-86 (2003). 
15 This term refers to instances in which the executive branch intervenes on behalf of 
corporate defendants-usually at the defendants' behest-in human rights lawsuits in the 
United States. 
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three contemporary corporate human rights abuse cases in which strik-
ing factual and legal similarities demonstrate the birth of a new trend 
in human rights litigation. Part III examines the judicial doctrines as 
applied in these cases, arguing that the doctrines, on their terms, are 
not applicable in many human rights cases. Part IV offers a broader 
context by identifYing the potential for further abuse if executive-
corporate collusion continues, and exploring the powerful role of the 
executive branch in courts' decisions whether to acljudicate human 
rights cases. Part IV also prmides a policy critique of the Bush admini-
stration for its demonstrated willingness to intervene in human rights 
litigation on the behalf of corporate defendants. The Note concludes 
that human rights ideals, which are a staple of the administration's po-
litical rhetoric, should constitute an integral part of American foreign 
policy, and hence preclude future executive intervention in corporate 
human rights litigation. 
1. THREE DOCTRINES 
The political question, act of state, and international comity doc-
trines, which require dismissal for prudential and constitutional rea-
sons in instances where jurisdiction is nonetheless appropriate, elude 
easy categorization. 16 The political question doctrine is the subject of 
debate between courts and commentators, some of whom view it as a 
jurisdictional limitation, while others see it as a prudential or constitu-
tional doctrineY The act of state doctrine is based on separation of 
powers concerns, yet it is also grounded in principles of diplomatic 
comity.IS International comity has no constitutional underpinning, 
but is a de,ice of international relations that requires deference when 
one state's courts deal with the official acts of another state. 19 
The three doctrines share a common purpose, however, as tools 
that prevent diplomatically-sensitive litigation from frustrating the po-
16 Sec. e.g., Bigio Y. Coca-Cola Co., 239 F.3d 440, 452 n.7 (2d Cir. 2000) (illustrating the 
tension among courts as to whether the act of state doctrine is properly categorized as an 
abstention doctrine or a rule of decision). Forum nOll CONveniens. another doctrine that is 
often invoked in mass tort cases also frequently presents a substantial obstacle to adjudica-
tion. Sec, e.g., Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 303 F.3d -170, 480 (2d Cir. 2002) (dismissing, on 
j01"ll1ll non conveniens grounds, Ecuadoran plaintiffs' class-action lawsuit against oil company 
for environmental tort); Villeda Aldena v. Fresh Del !llonte Produce, No. 01-CV-3399 
(S,D. Fla. filed Aug. 2, 2001). 
17 Sec Sarei Y. Rio Tinto PLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1193 n.273 (C.D. Cal. 2002). 
18 Sec Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423 (1964); Oetjen Y. Cen-
tral Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 303-04 (1918). 
19 Hilton Y. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895). 
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litical branches' ability to conduct foreign relations.20 Each has figured 
prominently in recent corporate human rights abuse cases. 21 
A. The Political Question Doctline 
The political question doctrine is a prudential and constitutional 
mechanism by which a court that has jurisdiction over a dispute de-
clines to adjudicate if the case raises questions that should be addressed 
by the political branches of government.22 The doctrine stems from 
Chief Justice Marshall's dictum in MarbUlY v. Madison that articulated 
on non-textual constitutional grounds the president'S "important po-
litical powers."23 The Supreme Court issued the authoritative modern 
opinion on the doctrine 159 years later in the landmark civil rights case 
Baker v. Can: 24 In that case, the Court called for the application of the 
doctrine in cases in which one of the following factors is "inextricably" 
involved: 
[1] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of 
the issue to a coordinate political department; [2] a lack of 
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving 
it; [3] the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy 
determination of a kind clearly for nOluudicial discretion; [4] 
the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolu-
tion without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate 
branches of government; [5] an unusual need for unques-
tioning adherence to a political decision already made; or [6] 
the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pro-
nouncements by various departments on one question. 25 
20 See Sarei, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 1184, 1193-94, 1205. 
21 See Doe v. Unocal Corp., 2002 WL 31063976, at *20 (9th Cir. 2002); Sa rei, 221 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1183, 1193, 1199; Plaintiffs' I'demo, supra note 8, at 31,35, Exxon (No. 01-CV-
1357). 
22 Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424, 483 (D.NJ. 1999). 
231\1arburyv. Madison, 5 U.S. (l Cranch) 137,165 (1803). 
24 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
25 Id. at 217. Some judges consider the political question doctrine generally, without 
analysis of the Baker factors. See id.; see, e.g., Abebe:Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 848 (11 th 
Cir. 1996); Linderv. Portocarrero, 963 F.2d 332, 337 (11 th Cir. 1992). This type of applica-
tion, which focuses more on the rule's policy underpinnings than on doctrine, is also 
common in cases involving the international comity doctrine. See infra note 54 and accom-
panying text. 
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Non-justiciability is most often invoked in cases affecting U.S. 
foreign relations.26 In the famous words of Justice Sutherland, the 
nonjusticiability of political questions touching on foreign relations is 
predicated upon the "very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the 
President as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of 
international relations. "27 Baker noted that the doctrine has particular 
relevance in cases touching on foreign affairs, but also carefully em-
phasized that not every such case presents nonjusticiable political 
questions. 28 
The use of the political question doctrine in human rights litiga-
tion is increasingly common; for example, several recent cases involving 
claims from the vVorld War II era were dismissed because they raised 
nonjusticiable political questions. 29 In Iwanowa v. FOld Motor Co., the 
district court found a claim by a forced laborer for a German Ford sub-
sidiary during World War II nonjusticiable on four of the six Baker fac-
tors. 30 Under factor one, the court found a constitutional commitment 
to the executive branch in the issue of war reparations, which affected 
U.S. relations with the international community.31 The court found that 
acljudication would demonstrate a lack of respect for the political 
branches and could involve multifarious pronouncements by various 
branches of government under factors four and six because of an exist-
ing treaty dealing with war reparations. 32 Finally, the court found that 
the existence of poten tially thousands of 50-year-old claims resulted in a 
lack of judicially manageable standards under factor twO.33 
B. The Act of State Doctri ne 
The act of state doctrine has been called the foreign relations 
equivalent of the political question doctrine.34 It provides that out of 
26 Baker, 369 U.S. at 211; [wanowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 484. 
27 United States y. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-20 (1936). 
28 BakC/; 369 U.S. at 211. 
29 Sce Hwang GeumJoo v.Japan, 172 F. Supp. 2d 52 (D.D.C. 2001) (dismissing a suit by 
Japanese "comfort women" against the government of Japan on political question doc-
trine); [n rc Nazi Era Cases Against German Defendants Litigation, 129 F. Supp. 2d 370 
(D.NJ. 2001) (requiring dismissal of a suit by forced laborers during World War Two 
(V,TWII) on political question grounds); [wallowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 424-25 (dismissing case 
by Russian forced laborers during ,,\;,\11 against the Ford Motor Company on political 
question doctrine). 
30 [wanowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 485-89. 
3} [d. at 485. 
32 !d. at 486-88. 
33 [d. at 489. 
34 Trajano v. l\Iarcos, 878 F.2d 1439, **2 (9th Cir. 1989). 
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respect for other states' sovereignty, U.S. courts should not judge the 
acts of foreign heads of state made within their states' sovereign terri-
tory.35 In the context of diplomatically-sensitive suits, the doctrine 
stands for the proposition that when the executive branch makes a 
determination on a matter affecting U.S. foreign relations, it is not for 
the judiciary to second-guess that branch's expertise by adjudicating 
what the executive concludes are sensitive claims.36 
Like the political question doctrine, the act of state doctrine has a 
foundation in separation of powers principles, although not in the con-
stitution's text.37 While the doctrine is not compelled by principles of 
international law or by the inherent nature of sovereignty, both con-
tribute to its underlying policy.38 In Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 
the Supreme Court enumerated three considerations for courts decid-
ing whether to adjudicate claims that implicate the act of state doctrine: 
[1] the greater the degree of codification or consensus con-
cerning a particular area of international law, the more ap-
propriate it is for the judiciary to render decisions regarding 
it; [2] the less important the implications of an issue are for 
our foreign relations, the weaker the justification for exclusiv-
ity in the political branches; [3] [t] he balance of relevant con-
siderations may also be shifted if the government which per-
petrated the challenged act of state is no longer in existence.39 
Unlike the political question doctrine, the primary purpose of which 
is preserving the political branches' prerogative in matters of foreign 
relations, the act of state doctrine is theoretically concerned with the 
separation of powers on a level once-removed.40 The doctrine's pri-
35 Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897); see also Foreign Sovereign Immu-
nities Act of 1976,28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-1611 (1994) (providing foreign sovereigns with 
immunity to suit). 
36 See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 243 F. Supp. 957, 975 (S.D.N.\: 1965), a/I'd, 383 
F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 1967). 
37 See Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 423. 
38 See Kirkpatrick Co. v. Envt'l Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400, 404 (1990); Sabbatino, 376 
U.S. at 421. 
39 Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428. Although this standard was offered in the context of ex-
propriation of property by a foreign goyernment, the Sabbatino factors have since been 
considered in a number of cases of corporate accountability that do not involve expropria-
tion issues. See, e.g., Envt'l Tectonics, 493 U.S. at 401-02; Doe v. Unocal Corp., 2002 WL 
31063976 (9th Cir. 2002), reh'g en banc granted and opinion vacated, 2003 WL 359787, at *1, 
19-20 (9th Cir. 2003) (Nos. 00-56603, 00-56608); Bigio v. Coca-Cola Co., 239 F.3d 440, 
444-51 (2d Cir. 2000); Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1121-29, 1183 (C.D. 
Cal. 2002). 
40 See Envt'l Tectonics, 493 U.S. at 405. 
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mary function is to avoid passing judgment on the official acts of gov-
ernments-in other words, maintaining respectful diplomatic rela-
tions between states,41 Because of the dominant role the political 
branches have typically played in that effort, however, the act of state 
doctrine implicates significant tensions that can arise between the judi-
ciary and the executive.42 
The act of state doctrine, which has frequently been raised by de-
fendant corporations,43 has rarely been successful in defeating human 
rights claims.44 Wiwa 1). Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. illustrates the doc-
trine's application in a recent corporate human rights case that did not 
involve an intenention by the executive branch.45 Citizens of the 
Ogoni region of Nigeria sued two European oil companies, which they 
claimed had directed Nigeria's security forces violently to suppress local 
opposition to the companies' development efforts in the region. 46 The 
court rejected the defendants' act of state defense, based largely on the 
third Sabbatillo factor; since the regime responsible for the human 
rights abuse had, by the time of the lawsuit, been replaced by a demo-
cratic government critical of the prior regime, the court did not fear 
that adjudicating would strain U.S.-Nigeria relationsY 
41 Sec id. 
42 Sec id. 
43 Sec, e.g., Unocai, 2002 WL 31063976, at *19-20; Bigio, 239 F.3d at 451; Sa rei, 221 F, 
Supp. 2d at 1183; Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 2002 WL 319887, at *27 (S.D.N.Y. 
2002); Sampson v. Federal Republic of Germany, 975 F. Supp. 1108, 1121 (N.D. III. 1997), 
a/I'd, 250 F.3d 1145 (7th Cir. 2001); Beanal v. Freeport-I\IcMoRan, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362, 
367 (E.D. La. 1997) (dismissing corporate human rights abuse case by Indonesian nation-
als against mining corporation on standing and statutory grounds, despite defendant's act 
of state defense); Plaintiffs' Memo, SlljJJ'(I note 8, at 31, 35, Exxon (No. 01-CV-1357). 
44 See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 889 (2d Cir. 1980) (refusing to dismiss a case 
against the Paraguayan government for acts of torture on act of state grounds). Bllt see 
Burger-Fischer v. Degussa AG, 65 F. Supp. 2d 248 (D.NJ. 1999) (dismissing claims against 
corporations for use of sla\'e labor during \VWII on act of state grounds). Since Filartiga, 
the act of state doctrine has been raised, usually unsuccessfully, in a number of human 
rights cases. See, e.g., Sampson v. Federal Republic of Germany, 250 F.3d 1145, 1156-59 
(7th Cir. 2001) (dismissing suit against Germany for WW1I slave labor on jurisdictional 
grounds, explicitly reversing the district court's dismissal on act of state doctrine); Kadic v. 
K'lradZic, 70 F.3d 232, 250 (2d Cir. 1995) (allowing suit against Serbian war criminal over 
act of state defense); Trajano v. l\iarcos, 878 F.2d 1439, at **2 (9th Cir. 1989) (allowing 
adjudication of claims of torture against former Philippine President Ferdinand I\larcos 
despite act of state defense); Whva, 2002 Vv'L 319887, at *1 (allowing claims against Nige-
rian government despite act of state defense). 
45 Sec 2002 \v'L 319887, at *27. 
46 !d. at *1-2. 
47 Sec Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428; Whua, 2002 \\'1, 319887, at *28; see also Bodner v. 
BanguI" Paribas, 114 F. Supp. 2d 117, 130 (E.D.N.).: 2000) (declining to dismiss suit against 
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C. The International Comity Doctrine 
International comity is the deference a domestic court pays to 
the act of a foreign government that is not officially binding on the 
court. 48 Through comity, legal systems reflect the importance of re-
ciprocal tolerance and good wil1.49 Comity is not an obligation to dis-
miss sensitive cases; it is, however, more than a simple matter of cour-
tesy among nations.50 In its most recent statement on the doctrine, 
the Supreme Court found that a court with proper jurisdiction should 
dismiss a lawsuit on comity grounds only if an actual conflict exists 
between foreign and domestic law. 51 
International comity may properly be seen as the domestic equiva-
lent of the international law principle of jurisdiction to prescribe.52 
Thus, when a true conflict of laws exists, courts occasionally look to the 
Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, which 
sets out a lengthy but non-exhaustive list of factors to determine 
whether or not adjudication is "reasonable."53 In many diplomatically-
sensitive cases, however, courts invoke comity concerns only generally, 
in order to strengthen other bases for their judgments.54 
French financial institutions for economic collusion with Nazi government on act of state 
grounds, because the government in question had long since been replaced). 
48 Laker Airways Ltd. v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 604 F. Supp.280, 291 
(D.D.C. 1984). 
49 Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court for Southern Dist. of 
Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 555 (1987) (Blackmun,j., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
50 Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895). 
51 Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 798 (1993). 
52 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) m' THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 403 cmt. a (1987). 
53 See Sa rei, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 1199; RESTATEMENT, supra note 52, § 403(2). The factors 
are: (1) The link of the activity to the territory of the regulating state; (2) the connections, 
such as nationality, residence, or economic activity between the regulating state and the 
person principally responsible for the activity to be regulated; (3) the character of the 
activity to be regulated, the importance of regulation to the regulating state, the extent to 
which other states regulate such activities, and the degree to which the desirability of such 
regulation is generally accepted; (4) the existence of justified expectations that might be 
protected or hurt by the regulation; (5) the importance of the regulation to the interna-
tional political, legal, or economic system; (6) the extent to which the regulation is consis-
tent with the traditions of the international system; (7) the extent to which another state 
may have an interest in regulating the activity; and (8) the likelihood of conflict with regu-
lation of another state. Id. 
54 See, e.g., Ahmad v. Wigen, 910 F.2d 1063,1067 (2d Cir. 1990) (overturning district 
court's decision to take testimony from witnesses concerning Israel's law enforcement 
procedures because the in terests of in terna tional comity would be "ill-served" by sllch ac-
tion); Tachiona v. l\Iugabe, 169 F. Supp. 2d 259, 309 (S.D.N.Y 2001) (holding that princi-
ples of international comity do not preclude service of process to Zimbabwean President 
Robert Mugabe). 
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If the act of state doctrine is premised upon separation of powers 
concerns that are once-removed, then the international comity doc-
trine's separation of powers concerns are twice-removed. 55 Under the 
act of state and political question doctrines, deference to the executive 
in foreign relations matters appears plainly on the respective, court-
decreed standards. 56 Lawsuits implicate the international comity doc-
trine, however, not when the American executive fears an encroachment 
on its ability to conduct foreign relations, but when adjudication would 
contravene a policy, law, or prerogative of a foreign state.57 The United 
States has a clear foreign policy interest in a lawsuit once a foreign sov-
ereign has articulated its discomfort with adjudication-namely, main-
taining smooth diplomatic relations with the complaining state.58 
Recent litigation beuveen Ecuadorian nationals and oil giant 
Texaco for the latter's human rights and environmental abuses in the 
Oriente region of Ecuador demonstrates the application of the inter-
national comity doctrine.59 In a series of cases, the opinion of the Ec-
uadorian government-as opposed to the American executive-ap-
pears to have been dispositive in determining whether to dismiss the 
case.60 A federal district court initially dismissed the claims based 
largely npon the indignant insistence of the Ecuadoran government.61 
Yet several years later, when a new regime in Ecuador told the State 
Department that it had had a change of heart and wanted to see the 
claims adjudicated, a subsequent court vacated the dismissal order 
and the case proceeded.62 The suit was ultimately dismissed largely on 
forum non conveniens grounds and is now being pursued in Ecuador's 
courts.63 
55 See Sa rei. 221 F. Supp. 2d at 1199. 
56 See supra text accompanying notes 25 and 39. 
57 See HaTtjoTd Fire, 509 U.S. at 798. 
58 See SaTei, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 1205. 
59 See Aquinda v. Texaco, Inc., 945 F. Supp. 625, 627 (S.D.N.\: 1996) (dismissing suit on 
international comity and forum lion conveniens grounds), dismissal vacated Jota v. Texaco, 
Inc., 157 F.3d 153, 158-61 (2d Cir. 1998), reversed as modified Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 303 
F.3d 470, 480 (2d Cir. 2002). 
60 SeeJota, 157 F.3d at 156; Aquinda, 945 F. Supp. at 627; Sequihua v. Texaco, Inc., 847 
F. Supp. 61, 63 (S.D. Tex. 1994). 
61 See Sequilwa, 847 F. Supp. at 63. 
62 SeeJota, 157 F.3d at 156, 163. 
63 Aguinda, 303 F.3d at 480. The dismissal order noted that Ecuadoran courts re-
mained open to the plaintif£~ and that any decision rendered there would be enforceable 
in the United States. Id. at 477; Tyche Hendricks, Ecuadomns Put Chevron on Trial, S.F. 
eHRON., Oct. 21, 2003, at A3. The trial in Ecuador began in October of 2003. Hendricks, 
supra, atA3. 
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II. THREE CASES 
The three judicial doctrines have been the basis of decision in 
two recent cases of corporate human rights abuse abroad and will de-
termine whether a third pending case may proceed.64 The factual 
similarities of the cases are striking. Each involves allegations of mas-
sive human rights abuse committed by MNCs ill the mining and en-
ergy sectors.65 Two of the three corporations are based in the United 
States; the third has half a dozen group offices in the United States.66 
In each case, the abuse centers around natural resource exploration 
that has acutely impacted indigenous populations in remote corners 
of developing countries.67 In all three suits, judges asked the State 
Department to predict the lawsuit's potential to interfere with U.S. 
foreign policy.68 In the two cases that courts have ruled upon thus far, 
the courts' decisions whether to dismiss have followed the recom-
mendations of the State Department.69 
A. Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp. 
The ongoing Exxon case involves the alleged complicity of the 
Exxon Mobil Corporation in acts of torture, rape, and murder com-
mitted over a period of years by its plant security detail in Aceh, Indo-
64 See Doe v. Unocal Corp., 2002 WL 31063976, at *19 (9th Cir. 2002); S([Iri, 221 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1193, 1199; Plaintiffs' Memo, supra note 8, at 31,35, Exxon (No. 01-CV-1357). 
65 See Unocal, 2002 WL 31063976, at *3-4; Sarei, 221 F. Supp.2d at 1127; Plaintiffs' 
Complaint at 7, 14-19, Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 01-CV-1357 (D.D.C. filed June 19, 
2001) [hereinafter Plaintiffs' ComplaintJ. 
66 See Unocal Around the World 2 (2002) (asserting that Unocal's corporate headquar-
ters are in California), available at http://www.unocal.com/aboutucl/uclataglance.pdf 
(last visited Nov. 10, 2003); Rio Tinto Group Operations (asserting that while Rio Tinto's 
head offices are in London and Melbourne, among its 37 group offices are six offices in 
the United States), available at http://www.riotinto.com/about/ (last visited Nov. 10, 
2003); ExxonMobil Business Headquarters (asserting that ExxonMobil's business head-
quarters are located in Texas), available at http://www2.exxonmobil.com/Corprate 
/ About/Corp_AboutXOM.asp (last visited Nov. 10,2003). 
67 See Unoeal, 2002 \VL 31063976, at *1 (involving allegations of abuse in the Tenas-
serim region of Burma); Sa rei, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 1120 (involving allegations of abuse in 
Bougaiville, Papua New Guinea (PNG»; Plaintiffs' Complaint, supra note 65, at 12-14, 
Exxon (No. 01-1357) (involving allegations of abuse in Aceh, Indonesia). 
68 See San:i, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 1180-81; Nat'l Coalition Gov't of the Union of Burma v. 
Unocal, Inc., 176 F.R.D. 329, 335 (C.D. Cal. 1997), rev'd ill part, 2002 WL 31063976, at *1, 
reh'g en bane granted and opinion vacated, 2003 \NL 359787, at *1 (9th Cir. 2003); Civil 
Docket, Exxon (No. 01-CV-1357). The Department of Justice also intervened as amicus 
curiae in the en bane hearing of Unoeal. See U nocal Brief, supra note 7. 
69 See Uno cal, 2002'I'VL 31063976, at *21; Sarei, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 1198; see also note 235 
infra. 
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nesia. 70 Exxon began its energy exploration in Indonesia over 100 
years ago. 71 Around 1971, Exxon Mobil's predecessor-in-interest, Mo-
bil Oil, discovered a large natural gas field in Arun, located in Aceh 
Province, Indonesia.72 In return for exclusive access to the field's 
natural gas deposits, Mobil provided Indonesia's brutal military dicta-
tor, General Suharto, blank shares in Mobil Oil, among other forms 
of payment.73 Mobil, now Exxon Mobil, continued to operate at the 
Arun site, which was one of the largest and most profitable natural gas 
projects in the world, until 2001.74 
Aceh has been the site of a violent separatist insurrection since 
1976, and was under direct military control from 1990 to 1998.75 Hu-
man rights abuses attributed to military troops in the region during 
and after that time include torture, rape, extrajudicial execution, and 
forced disappearances of civilians.76 Amidst this conflict, Mobil alleg-
edly con tracted with a unit of the notorious Indonesian military to 
supply security for its Arun plant, paying monthly or annual fees for 
the troops' services, and providing them with facilities and supplies.77 
Throughout their tenure as security personnel at the Arun plant, In-
donesian troops perpetuated a terror campaign against Acehnese citi-
zens unaffiliated with the separatist movement. 7S 
The plaintiffs, eleven anonymous Acehnese citizens, filed suit in 
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia in 2001, 
under the aegis of International Labor Rights Fund, a U.S.-based llU-
man rights organization.79 The citizens' allegations include physical 
and psychological torture, sexual assault, physical abuse, and murder. so 
Exxon Mobil moved to dismiss less than four months after the plaintiffs 
70 Plaintiffs' Complaint, supra note 65, at 14-23, Exxon (No. 01-CV-1357). The above 
statement of facts in Exxon comes from the plaintiffs' complaint, and should not be con-
strued as proven at this stage in the litigation. See id. 
71 ld. at 12, para. 31. The corporation began its exploration in Indonesia as Mobil 
Corporation, which was subsumed by Exxon in 1999, and is now a wholly-owned subsidiary 
of Exxon Mobil. ld., at 7-8, para. 17. Exxon l\Iobil is currently the second largest privately-
held American corporation. Fortune, Fortune 500, at 2002, available at http://www. for-
tune.com/fortune/fortune500 (last visited Nov. 10,2003). 
72 Plaintiffs' Complaint, supra note 65, at 12, para. 31, Exxon (No. 01-CV-1357). 
73 ld. at 12, para. 32. 
74 ld. at 7, para. 17; id. at 13, para. 35. 
75 HUM. RTS. WATCH, INDONESIA: THE WAR IN ACEH 7-8 (2001), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/aceh/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2003). 
76 Plaintiffs' Complaint, supra note 65, at 19-23, EX:>eon (No 01-CV-1357). 
771d. at 14-16. 
78 ld. at 15, para. 41. 
79 Oily Diplomacy, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19,2002, at A16. 
80 Plaintiffs' Complaint, supra note 65, at 19-23, Exxon (No 01-CV-1357). 
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initiated the lawsuit, claiming inter alia that the act of state and political 
question doctrines barred adjudication.81 Roughly six months later, 
Exxon convinced the district court judge to solicit the views of the State 
Department regarding whether adjudication would interfere with U.S. 
foreign relations.82 In response, the Legal Adviser of the Department of 
State, William H. Taft IV, submitted a six-page letter to the court argu-
ing that U.S. foreign policy favored dismissing of the suit for two rea-
sons.83 First, adjudicating the abuses of the Indonesian security forces 
could embarrass the Indonesian government, causing it to waver in its 
cooperation with the United States in the war against terrorism.84 Sec-
ond, the Indonesian government had threatened to retaliate by deny-
ing U.S. corporations lucrative government contracts in the future, 
which would harm U.S. economic and strategic interests.85 
Criticism of the State Department's intervention was swift and 
multifaceted. Legal experts,86 the popular press,87 human rights or-
ganizations,88 and even members of Congress89 denounced the move 
as a hypocritical betrayal of the principles behind the war on terror, as 
well as America's renewed drive toward corporate accountability in 
81 Civil Docket, Exxon (No. 01-CV-1357); Plaintiff's Memo, supra note 8, at 31, Exxon 
(No 01-CV-1357). 
82 Civil Docket, Exxon (No. 01-CV-1357). 
83 Exxon Letter, supra note I, at 2. 
84 Id. at 3 ("This lawsuit could potentially disrupt the on-going and extensive United 
States efforts to secure Indonesia's cooperation in the fight against international terrorist 
activity.") . 
85 Id. at 4-5 ("[W]e note that increasing opportunities for U.S. business abroad is an 
important aspect of U.S. foreign policy. Under the circumstances presented here, the ad-
judication of these claims could prejudice the Government of Indonesia and Indonesian 
businesses against U.S. firms bidding on contracts in extractive and other industries."). 
86 See Affidavit of Harold Hongju Koh, Professor at \ale Law School, Aug. 28, 2002, in 
Terry Collingsworth, The Alien Tort Claims ,lct-A Fital Tool for Preventing Corporations from 
Holating Fundamental Human Rights, Attachment C, available at http://www.laborrights.org 
(last visited Nov. 10,2003); Roth, supra note 2, at 4. 
87 See, e.g., State of Indifference: The White House Backs Corporate Irresponsibility over Htmwn 
Rights, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Aug. 31, 2002, at All; Mary McGrory, Powell's Awkward 
Position, WASH. POST, Aug. 29, 2002, at A31; Oily Diplomacy, supra note 79, at A16; Mike 
O'Donnell, Moral Relativism Won't Defeat Terrorists, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 16, 2002, 
at 11. 
88 See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, U.S./lndonesia: Bush Backtracks on Corporate Responsibil-
ity, Aug. 7, 2002 [hereinafter Bush Backtracks], available at http://www.hrw.org/asia (last 
visited Nov. 10, 2003); Letter to Secretary of State Colin Powell from Directors of Human 
Rights NGOs, Aug. 26, 2002, available at http://www.lchr.org/workersJights/\\T_indonesia 
/wr_indonesia.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 2003). 
89 See Letter to Secretary of State Colin Powell from Members of the United States 
Congress, Oct. 8, 2002, in Collingsworth, supra note 86, at Attachment B. 
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the wake of a number of financial mismanagement scandals.90 As the 
discussion below indicates, however, the intervention in Exxon was 
neither the Bush administration's first nor its last.91 
B. Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC 
Rio Tinto PLC, a large, British-based mining firm with plants 
around the world and in the United States, collaborated with the gov-
ernment of Papua New Guinea (PNG) to build a mine on the PNG is-
land of Bougainville in the 1960s.92 Allegedly, this venture necessitated 
displacing villages and destroying large amoun ts of rainforest. 93 Thus, 
Rio Tinto, in a move strikingly similar to Exxon Mobil's collusion with 
the Indonesian government, reportedly offered approximately 19% of 
the mine's profits to the PNG government in order to secure its coop-
eration in the effort.94 Because Rio Tinto revenues were crucial to PNG, 
the government allegedly gave the company direct military control over 
its mining operations.95 Though villagers in the path of the develop-
ment fiercely resisted, PNG troops allegedly uprooted their homes and 
constructed the Panguna mine, which became one of the world's larg-
est. 96 Popular opposition to the enormous mine grew during its con-
struction, leading to acts of sabotage by citizens, harsh reprisals by the 
military, and eventually, a protracted civil war.97 
In addition to massive environmental torts and cultural degrada-
tion, the plaintiffs, twenty-two current and former residents of Bou-
gainville, claimed war crimes, crimes against humanity, and massive 
human rights abuses stemming from Rio Tinto's mining operation and 
the civil war it sparked.98 The war crimes charge was pardy the result of 
the government's comprehensive blockade of the island during the 
chil war, which prevented the delivery of medical supplies, causing up-
90 See Roth, supra note 2, at 4. 
91 See Civil Docket, Exxon (No. 01-CV-1357). 
92 Sarei v. Rio Tin to PLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1121 (C.D. Cal. 2002). 
93 Id. at 1122. 
94 Id. at 1121. 
95 Id. at 1124-25. 
96 !d. at 1123-24. 
97 Semi, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 1124-26; see also Chris Sherwell, Bougaillville Secessionist Hhr 
Horsens, FIN. TIMES (London), Feb. 10, 1990, at 3. 
98 Sarei, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 1124-28; Michael Fathers, Retlo/ution il1 Paradise. INDEPEND-
ENT (London), july 21,1991, at 8 (reporting "murder and atrocities" committed by both 
sides during the early stages of the civil \\'ar). In addition to human rights abuses, the scale 
of environmental degradation in Bougainville was truly staggering. See Fathers, supra, at 8. 
By 1987, as a result of the Panguna mine, one billion tons of waste from a hole in the earth 
six miles wide had infested the region's waterways. Id. 
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wards of 10,000 Bougainvillean deaths.99 The plaintiffs also alleged vio-
lations of the laws of war, such as targeting civilian populations, pillage, 
rape, perfidious use of the Red Cross symbol, and wanton killing. loo Be-
cause the Panguna mine was at the heart of the conflict, the plain tiffs 
sought to hold Rio Tinto, the impetus behind the project and its pri-
mary beneficiary, responsible for civilian losses. lol 
The court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims on several grounds. l02 It 
dismissed their claims of environmental tort and racial discrimination 
incident to Rio Tinto's hiring and payment schemes under the act of 
state and international comity doctrines.103 Significantly, these two 
doctrines did not preclude the plaintiffs' arguably more serious llU-
man rights claims of war crimes and crimes against humanity.l04 The 
court dashed any hope of a human rights victory in the case, however, 
by dismissing all claims under the political question doctrine. l05 If 
Exxon is the case-study, then Sarei is the danger of what it might hold. l06 
C. Doe v. U nocal Corp. 
Unocal Corporation, which maintains its headquarters in Cali-
fornia, has owned a 28% interest in the Yadana natural gas field off 
the coast of Myanmar since 1992.107 Along with a French oil company 
and the state-owned oil company of Myanmar, Unocal developed the 
Yadana field's deposits as part of an effort to ship natural gas from 
Myanmar's coast through a pipeline to Thailand. lOs The pipeline was 
to run through Myanmar's rural Tenasserim region. l09 
The Myanmar military, which has long been criticized for violat-
ing human rights, allegedly forced villagers from the Tenasserim re-
gion to work on construction of the pipeline, committing acts of 
99 Sarei, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 1126-27. 
100 [d. at 1127. 
101 See id. 
102 [d. at 1208-09. 
103 [d. at 1193, 1207. 
104 See Sa rei, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 1193,1207. 
105 See id. at 1198-99. 
106 See discllssion supra Part II.A. The defendants in Exxon, in seeking the State De-
partment's opinion on the foreign policy implications of that case, simply followed the 
successful legal strategy of the Sarei defendant. Waldman & Mapes, supra note 5, at B1. 
107 UI/oeal, 2002 WL 31063976, at *1; Unocal Around the World, supra note 66, at 2. 
Unocal's corporate motto is "Improving People's Lives Wherever We Work." Unocal 
Around the World, supra, at 2. 
lOB Unocal, 2002 WL 31063976, at *1. 
109 [d. 
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murder, torture, and rape in the process.110 Unocal and its partners 
on the Yadana project allegedly hired the milit.'lry as their security de-
tail, and directed troops in their daily operations. ll1 The United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that Unocal was aware 
of the military's dismal human rights record before investing in the 
project, and that Unocal knew about allegations of continued abuse 
in connection with the project once construction had begun. ll2 
The U nocal litigation involves three lawsuits. ll3 In 1996, four 
Tenasserim villagers, the Federation of Trade Unions of Burma, and 
the Burmese government-in-exile brought suit in federal district court 
under the ATCA, alleging human rights abuses and confiscation of 
property without compensation.l14 In 1997, the court granted Unocal's 
motion to dismiss against two complainants, finding that the govern-
ment-in-exile and the trade unions lacked standing to sue, but allowed 
the suit by the four villagers to proceed. ll5 Also in 1996, fourteen 
Tenasserim villagers sued U nocal and its partners in the Yadana project 
in district court under the ATCA and RICO for similar offenses.1l6 The 
court granted in part Unocal's motion to dismiss the claims against the 
Myanmar military and state oil company under the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act. 117 
In 1997, the court in the case brought by the initial four villagers 
sought the opinion of the State Department regarding whether adju-
dicating the remaining issues could adversely impact U.S. foreign pol-
icy interests.118 In a letter to the judge, the Department opined that, 
although all pertinen t facts had not yet come to the surface, the suit 
did not appear to pose a foreign relations problem.119 The district 
court then consolidated the remaining claims and granted Unocal's 
motion for summary judgment based on the absence of state action 
\10 [d. at *3-4; sec also HUM. RTS. WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2001, at 172-79. 
11l Unocal, 2002 WL 31063976, at *2-3. At the least, Unocal was aware of the fact that 
the Myanmar military provided security and other sen'ices for this project. [d. at *2. 
\12 [d. at *4-5. 
113 Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997); Nat'l Coalition Gov't of the 
Union of Burma v. Unocal, Inc., 176 F.R.D. 329, 329 (C.D. Cal. 1997); Roe v. Unocal Corp. 
& Union Oil Co. of Cal., No. BC 237679 (L.A. Sup. Ct. filed Sept. 29, 2000). 
\14 See Nat'/ Coalition Gov't, 176 F.R.D. at 334. 
\15 !d. at 360. 
\16 Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. at 883. 
117 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602 (1976); Unocal Corp., 
963 F. Supp. at 897-98. 
\18 Nat'/ Coalition Gov't, 176 F.R.D. at 354. 
\19 !d. at 362. 
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and subject matter jurisdiction.120 In 2002, the Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit reversed in part the district court's dismissal order, 
finding that the ATCA case against U nocal could proceed in part be-
cause the act of state doctrine posed no barrier.l2l In February of 
2003, this ruling was vacated in preparation for a re-hearing before an 
eleven-member en banc panel of the Ninth Circuit. At the time of this 
writing, the en banc ruling is pending. A third case filed in California 
state court began in February 2003.122 
The Unocallitigation represents the best and worst of both worlds 
to human rights plaintiffs.123 In contrast to the court in Sarei, the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals, in its vacated judgment in Unocal, determined 
that the act of state doctrine did not bar the plaintiffs' claims of rights 
abuse-political questions and international comity did not figure into 
its decision-and remanded the case for trial. 124 This victory was cele-
brated far and wide as an unprecedented step in holding MNCs liable 
in U.S. courts.125 Unocal, however, is also the most recent evidence that 
corporate defendants accused of human rights violations abroad have 
caught on to the current executive's willingness to intercede on their 
behalf.126 After the highly public State Department intervention in 
Ex.'Y:on, and one month before the Court of Appeals ruled against Uno-
cal's motion to dismiss, defendant Unocal successfully petitioned the 
trial judge in the case's parallel state proceeding to seek the State De-
partment's views on the lawsuit's foreign policy implications.127 Al-
though the Department had advised the district court in 1997 that it 
did not anticipate foreign relations problems stemming from the law-
suit, the defendant had urged the court to petition the Bush admini-
stration's State Department for its views on the matter. 128 As of this writ-
ing, the State Department has not yet made its views known to the 
court. 129 
120 Doe v. Unocal Corp., 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294,1296 (C.D. Cal. 2000). 
121 Doe v. U nocal Corp., 2002 WL 31063976, at *24 (9th Cir. 2002), reh g en banc granted 
and opinion vacated, 2003 WL 359787, at *1 (9th Cir. 2003) (Nos. 00-56603, 00-56608). 
122 Civil Docket, Union Oil, No. BC 237679; Lisa Girion, U.S. Ruling Says Firms Liable jor 
Abuse Abroad, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2002, at AI. 
123 See Girion, supra note 122, at AI. 
124 Unocal, 2002 WL 31063976, at *21. 
125 See Girion, supra note 122, at AI. 
126 See Sonni Efron, Judge Lets Unocal.4sk State Dept. to Intervene in Myanmar Lawsuit, L.A. 
TIMES, Aug. 8, 2002, § 3, at 2. 
127 See id. 
128 See id. 
129 Civil Docket, Union Oil, No. BC237679. 
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Further, in antiCipation of oral arguments before the en banc 
panel of the Ninth Circuit in the summer of 2003, the Justice Depart-
ment intervened with an amicus brief, in which it bypassed criticizing a 
specific doctrine, advancing instead the bold position that the ATCA 
should no longer be interpreted to cover international human rights 
lawsuits,13o Because of the Justice Department's intervention, the fed-
eral appellate-level of the hearing, and the Bush administration's in-
creasingly recognizable fingerprint on corporate human rights suits, 
the pending Ninth Circuit case has attracted considerable attention131 
and is now considered the forum for a final "showdown" over the 
ATCA.132 
III. HUMAN RIGHTS-FRIENDLY DOCTRINE 
The executive interventions in Unocal, Exxon, and Sarei constitute a 
new trend in human rights litigation. Never before have so many vic-
tims of human rights abuse sought to hold MNCs accountable in U.S. 
courts for their actions abroad.133 And never before has a president, 
invoking diplomatic sensitivity, demonstrated such a willingness to in-
tercede in human rights litigation on the behalf of corporate defen-
dants. 134 This situation makes for a litigation climate that is uniquely 
pernicious to human rights plaintiffs. 135 
A close examination of the role of the judicial doctrines in these 
three cases, however, demonstrates that despite the Bush administra-
tion's propensity for interyening on behalf of defendants, the doc-
trines' ability to frustrate human rights plaintiffs may be tenuous.136 
130 See Unocal Brief, supra note 7, at 4. 
131 See. e.g., Policing Human Rights, WASH. POST, Aug. 14, 2003, at A18; An Important 
Human Rights Tool, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2003, at A16; Marianne Lavelle &Joellen Perry, The 
Court of Foreign Affairs, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June 23, 2003, at 31; The Alien Problem, 
ECONOMIST, June 21, 2003, at 51; Michael O'Donnell, Capitalism vs Conscience: Companies 
Abuse Human Rights and the Feds Don't Care, L.A. TIMES, June 9, 2003, at B11; Ka Hsaw Wa, 
COUI·t Is Fillagers' Only Hope, L.A. TIMES, June 9,2003, at B11. 
132 See Alex Markels, Showdown for a Tool in Rights Lawsuits, N.V. TIMES, June 15, 2003, 
§ 3, at 11. 
133 SccCorn, supra note 11, at 31. 
134 See Anne-Marie Slaughter & David Bosco, Plaintiff's Diplomacy, FOREIGN AFF., 
Sept./Oct. 2000, at 102, 104-05 (stating that President Reagan attempted to limit the 
scope of the ATCA but did not intercede in litigation to a significant extent, while Presi-
dent Clinton preferred allowing human rights litigation); vValdman & Mapes, supra note 5, 
at B1 (stating that President Clinton's State Department generally remained neutral in 
diplomatically-sensitive human rights cases). 
135 SeeV.'aldman & Mapes, supra note 5, at B1. 
136 See discussion infra Parts lIlA-C. 
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Legal deficiencies exist in the application of the political question and 
international comity doctrines in corporate human rights cases.137 The 
act of state doctrine, by its own terms, is inapplicable in such cases.138 In 
short, the three doctrines may be more human rights-friendly legal de-
vices than Sarei and Ext)(on portend. 139 
A. Sarei: A. Political Question? 
Of all three judicial doctrines, the political question doctrine, the 
basis for dismissal in SaTei, presents the biggest obstacle for human 
rights plain tiffs. 140 In particular, the latter three Baker factors have the 
potential to pose a significant threat.l41 These doctrine is not, how-
eyer, an insurmountable barrier to human rights adjudication. 142 Af-
137 See discussion infra Parts IILA, C. 
138 See discussion infra Part IILB. 
139 SeeSarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1195 (C.D. Cal. 2002); Exxon Let· 
ter, supra note 1, at 2. 
140 See Sa rei, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 1195. 
141 See id. at 1198; Kadic v. KaradZic, 70 F.3d 232, 249-50 (2d Cir. 1995) (resolving po-
litical question issue primarilv on fourth through sixth Baker factors). The \VVVII-era hu-
man rights cases also demonstrate the importance of the latter three Bakerfactors, albeit in 
a litigation context that also allowed the courts to consider other Baker factors. See In re 
Nazi Era Cases, 129 F. Supp. 2d 370, 378 (D.NJ. 2001) (dismissing suit by forced \v\vII 
laborers against military parts company based on commitment to the political branches); 
Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424, 485-89 (D.NJ. 1999) (dismissing case by 
',",\vII-era forced laborers against motor company on first, second, fourth and sixth Baker 
factors); Burger-Fischer v. Degussa AG, 65 F. Supp. 2d 248, 282-85 (D.NJ. 1999) (dismiss-
ing class·action suit against German corporation by 'VWII-era slave laborers on all Baker 
factors, but especially because of commitment to the political branches). The W\VII-era 
cases list among their reasoning the unmanageability of the cases and the lack of clear 
standards. See Iwanowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 488-89. In the context of cases stemming from 
actions that were thirty or more years old, and which occurred on the massive scale of 
protracted, global war, this objection is perfectly reasonable. See id. But cases stemming 
from smallel~scale, contemporary abuses, such as the corporate human rights cases exam-
ined in this Note, do not suffer from the same unmanageability and lack of standards. See 
Kadic, 70 F.3d at 249. 
142 See Kadic, 70 F.3d at 249. The Baker factors are: 
[1] a textually demonsu'able constitutional commitment of the issue to a co-
ordinate political department; [2] a lack of judicially discoverable and man-
ageable standards for resolving it; [3] the impossibility of deciding without an 
initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; [4] 
the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without ex-
pressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; [5] an 
unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already 
made; or [6] the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pro-
nouncements by various departments on one question. 
Bakerv. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,217 (1962). 
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ter all, as the Supreme Court has noted, dismissal based on the politi-
cal question doctrine should be the exception, not the rule,143 
In Sa rei, the court dismissed all of the Bougainvillean plaintiffs' 
claims under the political question doctrine. 144 After the State Depart-
ment argued that the executive opposed adjudication, the court dis-
missed pursuant to the fourth and sixth Baker factors, "the impossibility 
of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing 
lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government," and "the 
potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by 
various departments on one question."145 The court implicitly relied in 
turn on the fifth factor, "an unusual need for unquestioning adherence 
to a political decision already made," in the form of the St.:'lte Depart-
ment's letter arguing that adjudication would prejudice U.S. foreign 
relations,146 Thus the Sa rei court was wary of contradicting the ex-
pressed policy of the executive by adjudicating claims against the de-
fendants for complicity in PNG troops' human rights abuses. 147 
1. Baher Factors One Through Three: A Minor Threat 
The first three Baher factors are ill-suited to corporate defendan ts 
in human rights cases.148 Despite some courts' claims to the contrary, 
there is no constitutional commitment to the executive branch for 
handling foreign relations under factor one, and certainly no textual 
restraint by subject-matter on cases properly acljudicated by the judi-
ciary.149 Regarding factor two, barring the establishment of an arbitra-
143 Sec BakCl; 369 U.S. at 211. 
144 Sarei, 221 F. Supp. 2d. at 1198-99. While the international comity and act of state 
doctrines precluded adjudication of the plaintiffs' environmental tort and racial discrimi-
nation claims only, those claims and the plaintiffs' arguably more important human rights 
claims were dismissed as nonjusticiable political questions. Sec id. at 1184, 1201. The po-
litical question doctrine was, in other words, the "double-lock" to the door of adjudication. 
Sec THOMAS 1\1. FRANCK, POLITICAL QUESTIONS/JUDICIAL ANSWERS: DOES THE RULE OF LAW 
J\pPLYTO FOREIGN AFFAIRS? 28 (1992). 
145 Baher, 369 U.S. at 217; SaTei, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 1198. 
146 Sec Sa rei, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 1198. The State Department had also made several 
statements in support of the PNG government in its efforts to secure a peace accord end-
ing the Bougainville civil war. [d. at 1196. 
147 See id. at 1198. 
148 Sec Kadic, 70 F.3d at 249-50. But sec Williams, supm note 13, at 872-76 (arguing, in 
the context of \V\\lll-era cases, that Baker factors four through six are less likely to present 
an obstacle to human rights plaintiffs than factors one through three). 
149 Sec FRANCK, sujJ/,{/ note 144, at 15-16. Professor Franck argues that there is no con-
stitutionally created authority over foreign relations, let alone one reserved to the execu-
tive. !d. Rather, he argues, the drafters enumerated a number of constitutional powers that 
could fall under the blanket category of "foreign relations" and divided them relatively 
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tion panel or bilateral reparations scheme, as in the Nazi forced labor 
cases, the resolution of disputes is indisputably the province of the 
courts.150 Finally, under factor three, statutes such as the ATCA and 
TVPA, as well as universally accepted norms of international law, pro-
vide clear, judicially manageable standards for adjudicating private 
human rights claims.151 
2. Baker Factor Five: "Adherence to a Political Decision Already Made" 
A point of departure with the Sarei court's application of the po-
litical question doctrine is factor five, "an ullusual need for unquestion-
ing adherence to a political decision already made. "152 The U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in the 1995 case Kadic v. Kamdiic, 
articulated an interpretation of this factor that is more amenable to 
human rights plaintiffs, and more consistent with the spirit of Bakel; 
than Sarei employed when it dismissed the plaintiffs' claims as non-
justiciable.153 Circuit Judge Jon O. Newman rearticulated Baker's admo-
nition that not every case affecting foreign relations is a political ques-
tion and went on to say that 'Judges should not reflexively invoke these 
doctrines to avoid difficult and somewhat sensitive decisions in the con-
text of human rights. "154 This interpretation of the doctrine in light of 
contemporary human rights litigation reflects Bakds language: an UIl-
usual need for unquestioning adherence suggests that nonjusticiability 
should be a rare diagnosis.155 Kadic's interpretation also reflects a policy 
position that accountability for human rights abuse, in its own right, is 
an important goal that should not easily be trumped.156 
Kadic, however, was a decision written with the confidence of a 
judge whose conclusion enjoyed the express support of the executive 
equally among the branches. ld. at 16. For instance, the legislative branch has either an 
exclusive power or at least an important role over foreign commerce, declaring war, raising 
and funding the armed forces, spending on foreign affairs, appointment of ambassadors, 
and consent to treaties. ld. The judiciary, by contrast, was given the power to adjudicate 
disputes without any specific exceptions by subject matter, which, Franck maintains, sug-
gests that it should adjudicate all disputes, including those touching on foreign relations. 
ld. 
150 See Kadic, 70 F.3d at 249; lwanowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 486-87. 
151 Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1993); Torture Victim Protection Act, 28 
U.S.C. § 1350 (1993); Kadic70 F.3d at 249. 
152 See Baker, 369 U.S. at 217 (emphasis supplied). 
153 See id.; Kadic, 70 F.3d at 249; Sarti, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 1196-98. 
154 Baker, 369 U.S. at 211; Kadic, 70 F.3d at 249. 
155 See Baker, 369 U.S. at 217; Kadic, 70 F.3d at 249. 
156 See Kadic, 70 F.3d at 249. 
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branch.157 One wonders how strong Kadic's human rights language 
would have been in the face of a direct request by the State Depart-
ment to dismiss the case.158 In truth, when the department of the ex-
ecutive charged with foreign relations makes a clear recommendation 
on a matter of U.S. foreign policy, it would flout most mainstream 
theories of separation of powers for a judge simply to ignore that ad-
vice.159 Although at least one commentator has forcefully argued that 
separation of powers does not limit the judiciary's authority to hear 
such cases, as a practical matter it is unrealistic at present to expect 
judges to ignore decades of precedent counseling an obeisance.160 
Thus, in the unusual case where the executive branch actually inter-
venes and makes a foreign relations argument, most judges can be 
expected to defer to its judgment.161 Barring a defiant act of inde-
pendence by the trial judge in Exxon, this does not bode well for the 
Acehnese plaintiffs.162 
3. Baker Factors Four Through Six 
Baker factors four, five and six, which together require respect for 
another branch's "political decision already made," are nonetheless 
amenable to attack as they apply to corporate human rights cases.163 
Under the political question doctrine, the fourth and sixth Baker fac-
tors are relevant only if continued adjudication would contradict a 
prior decision made by a political branch.164 Yet the Bush administra-
tion's inconsistent human rights policy could confuse judges about 
the executive's actual position, hindering their ability to determine 
whether a conflict between branches actually exists. President Bush 
has consistently and publicly denounced worldwide human rights 
abuses throughout his presidency, and his administration has fre-
157 See id. at 250. In Kadic, the State Department argued in a letter to the judge that ad-
judication of a known Serbian war criminal should not be barred out of concern over U.S. 
foreign relations. Id. 
158 See id. 
159 See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 243 F. Supp. 957, 975 (S.D.N.Y 1965). 
160 See FRANCK, supra note 144, at 15-16; see also infra note 235. 
161 See infra note 235. 
162 See Exxon, No. 01-CV-1357. The same does not hold true for the en bane rehearing 
of Unocal: the Justice Department's amicus submission in that case was not a solicited rec-
ommendation on the foreign relations ramifications of the suit, but rather an exclusively 
legal argument that focused mainly on the perceived misuse of the ATCA by human rights 
plaintiffs. SeeUnocal Brief, supra note 7. 
163 See Bakel; 369 U.S. at 217. 
164 Kadic, 70 F.3d at 249. 
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quently demanded accountability for human rights abusers, including 
members of the Indonesian military.165 This forceful rhetorical sup-
port for human rights values could easily muddle the executive's ac-
tual policy position of dismissing nettlesome human rights claims-
which arguably is not even a "decision" for political question pur-
poses.166 Hence, judges would be quite justified in their confusion 
over this stark contradiction in announced policy,167 
The administration's inconsistency in demanding a cessation of 
embarrassing human rights litigation while purporting to condemn 
human rights violations is painfully transparent in Exxon.168 The State 
Department's letter to the judge in that case made the following asser-
tions before enumerating its bases for requesting a dismissal: 
[T]he [State] Department would like to reaffirm its condem-
nation of human rights abuses by elements of the Indonesian 
armed forces in locations such as Aceh. Without expressing a 
165 See Hon. Sic han Siv, NGO Member of the U.S. Delegation, Remarks to the 57th Ses-
sion of the UN Commission on Human Rights (Apr. 17, 2001) (demanding accountability 
for those responsible for the deaths of four human rights activists in Aceh, Indonesia, Jafir 
Siddiq Hamzah, Idris bin \usuf, Emita binti Abdul Wahab, and Bachtiar bin Usman), at 
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/rm/2001/2276.htm; see also George W. Bush, Securing 
Freedom's Triumph, N.V: TIMES, Sept. 11, 2002, at A33; Is Torture Everfustified?, ECONOMIST, 
Jan. 11,2003, at 9 (describing President Bush as "consistent in his claims to be defending 
human rights and democracy" throughout the war on terror). Mr. Bush's presidency has 
been couched in the rhetoric of principle and high moral tone to a greater extent than 
any in recent memory. Sec generally David S. Broder, Bush's Unease with A.mbiguity, WASIL 
POST, April 9, 2002, at A19; Bill Keller, The Radical Presidency of George W Bush. N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 26, 2003, § 6, at 26. See also Samantha Power, Force Full, NEW REPUBLIC, t-.Iar. 3, 2003, at 
28, 29 (reporting that in the Bush administration's National Security Strategy, the words 
"human rights" appear five times; "human dignity" nine times; "liberty" eleven times, "de-
mocracy" thirteen times, and "freedom" forty-six times). In an opinion-editorial in the New 
lor:/; Times on the first anniversary of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the U.S., President Bush 
wrote about the American-led war on terror: 
[WJ e are determined to stand for the values that gave our nation its birth. vVe 
believe that freedom and respect for human rights are owed to every human 
being, in every culture. \Ve believe that the deliberate murder of innocent ci-
vilians and the oppression of women are everywhere and always \\Tong. 
Bush, supra, at 33. 
166 See Bush, supra note 165, at 33. The administration has also promoted human rights 
responsibility specifically to MNCs. See, e.g., U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, VOLUNTARY PRINCIPLES 
ON SECURITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS [hereinafter VOLUNTARY PRINCIPLES], available at 
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/2931.htm(Dec.20.2000).Thisnon-binding.joint effort 
of the U.S. and British governments to promote responsible relationships between com-
panies in the extractive and energy sectors and governments in site countries was largely 
coordinated by the U.S. executive branch. Sec id. 
167 See Bush, supra note 165, at 33. 
168 See Exxon Letter, supra note 1, at 2. 
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view on the allegations in this specific lawsuit, we would like to 
reiterate that a lasting, peaceful solution to the Aceh conflict 
that maintains Indonesian sovereignty can only be achieved if 
the military and police end human rights abuses. 169 
247 
Had the State Department not later expressly recommended dismissing 
the Exxon case, the judge would have been justified in some confusion 
over which policy should govern for purposes of evaluating a political 
question conflict between the branches-the administration's indig-
nant denunciation of rights abuses (favoring adjudication) or its deci-
sion to brush aside embarrassing rights cases (favoring dismissal) .170 
Thus, a future judge sympathetic to human rights plaintiffs could shn-
ply refrain from inviting the views of the State Department and allow 
adjudication, which would appear perfectly consistent with the execu-
th'e's careful denunciations of human rights abuse around the world. l71 
As the next section demonstrates, the implications of the administra-
tion's inconsistant human rights policy could also prevent courts from 
dismissing claims under the act of state doctrine. 
B. U nocal: No Act of State 
The act of state doctrine should not continue to pose a threat to 
human rights plaintiffs.172 The Unocal court's sensible rejection of the 
defendant's act of state defense in its vacated opinion stemmed from 
a reading of the rule in light of its policy underpinnings and its unique 
ability to thwart human rights plaintiffs.173 A similar application would 
prevent a dismissal under the doctrine in ExxolI, and in future cases.174 
As this section will demonstrate, this "human rights-friendly" reading 
of the act of state doctrine is the only justifiable approach. 175 
In its brief analysis of the act of state defense, the Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit in Unocal properly found that the doctrine 
169 [d.; sec also Sarc:'i Letter, sul)m note 8, at 1 (noting the State Department's concern 
that its recommendation of dismissal not be seen as a step back from its earlier denuncia-
tions of human righ ts abuses in Bougainville). 
170 Sec Exxon Letter, supm note I, at 2. 
I7I Sec id.; see also note 165, supra. 
172 See discussion infra Part III.B.2. 
173 See discussion infra Part III.B.l. 
174 See discussion infra Part III.B.l. 
175 See discussion infra Part III.B.2. 
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did not bar adjudication.176 On the first Sabbatino factor, which states 
that greater consensus concerning the area of international law to be 
applied favors adjudication, the court found the alleged human rights 
abuses of the Myanmar military to be universally condemned under 
international law, which supported allowing the suit to proceed.177 On 
the second factor, stating that adjudication becomes more appropri-
ate the less important an issue is to U.S. foreign relations, the court 
found that the State Department's consistent denunciations of 
Myanmar's rights abuses, as well as its letter stating that adjudication 
would not imperil U.S. foreign relations, demonstrated the absence of 
a foreign policy conflict.178 
The third Sabbatino factor, which weighs in favor of adjudication 
if the offending government is no longer in power, did not help the 
plaintiffs in Unocal because Myanmar's government had not changed 
between the time of alleged abuse and the court's decision.179 The 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has added a fourth factor to 
the three-part Sabbatino test: "whether the foreign state was acting in 
the public interest."180 Given the severity of the alleged human rights 
violations, the court rejected any intimation that the Myanmar mili-
tary was acting in the public interest; thus, this factor favored adjudi-
cation.181 Apparently using a quantitative balancing of the factors, the 
court found that two factors against dismissal (three counting the ad-
ditional Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit factor) outweighed 
one factor in favor of it. 182 
176 See Doe v. Unocal Corp., 2002 WL 31063976, at *19-21 (9th Cir. 2002), reh'g en bane 
t;ranted and opinion vacated, 2003 WL 359787, at *1 (9th Cir. 2003) (Nos. 00-56603, 00-
56608). 
177 See id. at *20; Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964). The 
Sabbatino factors are: 
ld. 
[1] the greater the degree of codification or consensus concerning a particu-
lar area of international law, the more appropriate it is for the judiciary to 
render decisions regarding it; [2] the less important the implications of an is-
sue are for our foreign relations, the weaker the justification for exclusivity in 
the political branches; [3] [t]he balance of relevant considerations may also 
be shifted if the government which perpetrated the challenged act of state is 
no longer in existence. 
178 Unoeal, 2002 WL 31063976, at *21. 
1791d. 
ISO Liu v. Republic of China, 892 F.2d 1419, 1432 (9th Cir. 1989). 
181 Unocal, 2002 WL 31063976, at *21. 
182 See id. 
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1. Unocal As an Example for Exxon and Future Cases 
Unocafs quantitative treatment of the Sabbatino factors is an exam-
ple for future corporate human rights abuse cases, including the en-
bane rehearing of that case, as well as Exxon. I83 If Exxon were to follow 
Unocafs approach, the defendant's motion to dismiss would be denied 
and adjudication would proceed on the merits. I84 Under factor one, 
the alleged abuses in Exxon were nearly identical to the universally con-
demned abuses in Un ocal, favoring acljudication. I85 Barring judicial 
confusion over conflicting policy statements, Sabbatino factor two favors 
dismissal in Exxon because of the State Department's clear recommen-
dation of dismissal in its letter to the judge. I86 Factor three, a change in 
government between alleged abuses and adjudication, would favor the 
plaintiffs. Is7 The tumultuous nature of the handover of power from 
Abdurrahman Wahid to Megawati Sukarnoputri after the closure of 
Exxon's Arun plant would presumably resolve any fear that adjudica-
tion would seriously offend Miss Megawati's government, despite the 
protestations ofIndonesia's foreign minister to the contrary.I8S 
183 See id. at *19-21. 
184 See id. 
185 See id. at *20; Plaintiffs' Complaint, supra note 65, at 19-22, Exxon (No. 01-CV-
1357). 
186 See Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428; Exxon Letter, sujJT([ note 1, at 1; see also discussion su-
pra Part III.A.3. 
187 See Sabbatino. 376 U.S. at 428; Megawati Takes Charge, ECONOMIST, July 28. 2001. at 13 
(reporting that in July of 2001, Megawati Sukarnoputri assumed the presidency of Indone-
sia in a precariolls transition from the government of Abdurrahman \Vahid). The Exxon 
plaintiffs alleged abuses during the period of direct military control of Aceh from 1989 to 
1998 and subsequently until March 2001. Plaintiffs' Complaint. supra note 65, at 15, Exxon 
(No. 01-CV-1357); Plaintiffs' Memo. supra note 8, at 7, Exxon (No. 01-CV-1357). Because 
the complained behavior ended in l\1arch, several months before the assumption of power 
bv Ms. Megawati, factor three weighs in favor of the plaintiffs. See Plaintiffs' Complaint, 
supm note 65, at 15, Exxon (No. 01-CV-1357). 
188 See Megawati Takes Charge, supra note 187, at 13; Letter from Soemadi Djoko M. 
Brotodiningrat. Indonesian Ambassador the United States, to Richard Armitage, Deputy 
Secretary of State (july 15, 2002) [hereinafter Ambassador's Letter] (arguing that a U.S. 
court's adjudication of acts of the Indonesian military is offensive as a matter of principle, 
could imperil foreign direct investment in the Aceh region. and could complicate efforts 
to find a peaceful solution to the Aceh conflict), available at http://www.Iaborrights.org 
(last visited Nov. 10. 2003). Ambassador Soemadi's letter contains polite diplomatic implo-
rations, but. more pointedly. a barely-veiled threat that U.S. nationals' investments in In-
donesia would suffer if the Exxon case were allowed to proceed. See Ambassador's Letter. 
Sill)/'({ (stating that "adjudication ... will definitely compromise the serious efforts of the 
Indonesian gm'ernment to guarantee the safety of foreign investments, including ill particu-
lar those fl'OlII the United States") (emphasis supplied). The threat was apparently effective in 
motivating the State Department to argue for dismissal in its letter to the Exxon judge; the 
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Under the quantitative approach to the act of state doctrine em-
ployed by Un oca I, two factors favoring adjudication and one factor fa-
voring dismissal should dictate that the Exxon defendants' motion to 
dismiss be denied. 189 The Supreme Court, however, described the 
paramount objective in the act of state analysis as preserving the politi-
cal branches' preeminence in matters of foreign relations, not assuring 
a rigid, quantitative application of the Sabbatino factors. 19o In light of 
that admonition, and the near-dispositive weight judges have typically 
ascribed to the executive's opinion on the diplomatic ramifications of 
lawsuits, it is distinctly possible that the Exxon court will give greater 
qualitative weight to factor two than factors one and three combined.191 
2. A Human Rights Approach to the Sabbatino Factors 
Notwithstanding balancing, a vigilant construction of Sabbatino fac-
tor one would preclude dismissal under the act of state doctrine in cor-
porate human rights cases, including Exxon. 192 Factor one, which links 
justiciability to the degree of consensus surrounding the law to be ap-
plied, demands dispositive weight in the act of state calculus. 193 Even 
Sa rei, a human rights failure because it dismissed all of the plaintiffs' 
claims on political question grounds, employed this approach.194 The 
act of state doctrine barred the plaintiffs' environmental and racial dis-
crimination claims. 195 The court, however, found that acts of genocide, 
torture, rape, and pillage could not be considered acts of state; thus, an 
examination of the second two Sabbatino factors was unnecessary.196 
In holding that grave human rights violations cannot properly 
qualify as acts of state, SaTei employed the only plausible interpreta-
tion of the act of state doctrine, considering its title and policy under-
Legal Adviser lists the threat to u.s. economic interests as one of two key bases for dis-
missal. Sec Exxon Letter, supra note 1, at 2. 
189 See Doe v. Unocal Corp., 2002 WL 31063976, at *20-21 (9th Cir. 2002), relt g en bane 
granted and opinion vacated, 2003 WL 359787, at *1 (9th Cir. 2003) (Nos. 00-56603, 00-
56608); Plaintiffs' Memo, supra note 8, at 33-35, Exxon (No. 01-CV-1357). The Ninth 
Circuit's fourth factor would also weigh in favor of adjudication if Exxon fell under its 
jurisdiction: Indonesia's military surely was not acting in the public interest by violating 
the human rights of the indigenous Acehnese. See Unoeal, 2002 WL 31063976, at *21; 
Plaintiffs' Memo, supra note 8, at 33-35, Exxon (No. 01-CV-1357). 
190 See Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428. 
191 See id.; see also infra note 235. 
192 See Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428. 
193 See Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1189 (C.D. Cal. 2002). 
194 See id. 
195 [d. at 1188. 
196 [d. at 1189. 
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pinnings.197 It is well established that human rights violations cannot 
be acts of state; therefore, the adjudication of atrocities cannot be 
prevented under the act of state doctrine, regardless of a lawsuit's 
purported potential for diplomatic insensitivity.198 Thus, even when 
the executive branch requests dismissal, cases involving collusion be-
tween exploitative MNCs and abusive governments simply cannot be 
dismissed under the act of state doctrine because, by the doctrine's 
own terms, the behavior in question was not an act of state. 199 
Sabbatino factors two and three are necessarily inconsequential 
under this approach to the act of state analysis. Nevertheless, factor 
three is entirely dependant upon the factual circumstances surround-
ing the case at bar: either there has been a regime change between 
the dates of alleged abuse and trial, or there has not.200 Factor two is 
vulnerable to the same weakness of conflicting policy signals that casts 
doubt upon the political question doctrine in human rights cases.201 
vVhere the executive, by its consistent denunciation of rights abuses, 
makes an argument for dismissal that appears wholly inconsistent with 
its announced foreign policy of human rights accountability, judges 
will doubtless have difficulty deciding what "the implications of an 
issue are for our foreign relations. "202 
A proper interpretation of the act of state doctrine strongly favors 
the adjudication of human rights claims. Thus, the doctrine should only 
continue to deteriorate in its influence in corporate rights abuse litiga-
tion.203 As the analysis below demonstrates, the international comity doc-
197 See Kirkpatrick Co. v. Envt'l Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400, 409 (1990) (stating the 
Court's position "that the policies underlying the act of state doctrine should be consid-
ered in deciding whether, despite the doctrine's technical availability, it should nonethe-
less not be invoked"); Sabbatillo, 376 U.S. at 428; Sarci, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 1189. 
198 See Doe v. Unocal Corp., 2002 ''VL 31063976, at *21 (9th Cir. 2002), reh'g en bane 
granted and opinion vacated, 2003 \VL 359787, at *1 (9th Cir. 2003) (Nos. 00-56603, 00-
56608); Kadic v. KaradZit, 70 F.3d 232, 250 (2d Cir. 1995); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 
876,889 (2d Cir. 1980); Sarei, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 1189. 
199 See Unocal, 2002 WL 31063976, at *21; Kadic, 70 F.3d at 250; Fila/·tiga, 630 F.2d at 
889; SaTIn, 221 F. SliPP. 2d at 1189. 
200 See Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428. This factor has led courts to reject defendants' mo-
tions to dismiss on act of state grounds in a number of cases. See Bigio v. Coca-Cola Co., 
239 F.3d 440,452-53 (2d Cir. 2000); Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 2002 WL 319887, 
at *28 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); Bodner v. Banque Paribas, 114 F. Sllpp.2d 117, 130 (E.D.N.\: 
2000). 
201 See discussion supra Part III.A.3. 
202 See Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428. 
203 See Andrew Saindon, Note, The Act of State Doctrine and International Human Rights 
Cases in United States Courts, 71\10.]. CONTEMP. INT'L LEGAL ISSUES 287, 308-09 (1995-96). 
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trine is also an inappropriate mechanism for frustrating human rights 
plain tiffs. 
C. Hopeful Signs fOT the InteTnational Comity Doctline 
The international comity doctrine does not pose as great a threat 
to human rights plaintiffs in diplomatically-sensitive lawsuits as the act 
of state and political question doctrines.204 While international comity 
was an obstacle to adjudicating several of the plaintiffs' claims in SaTe;, 
it did not bar the human rights claims in that case, in Exxon, or in 
Unocal. 205 Further, with the notable exception of several recent cases 
involving World War II-era claims of corporate collusion with Nazi 
Germany, international comity has not generally kept human rights 
plaintiffs from their day in court. 206 Given the doctrine's foreign pol-
icy underpinnings and the growing number of corporate human 
rights cases in U.S. courts, however, a brief evaluation of the doctrine 
early in its corporate human rights career seems appropriate.207 
Courts have tended to apply the international comity doctrine in 
ways that prevent it from barring human rights claims.208 In SaTei, the 
district court interpreted the Supreme Court's most recent interna-
tional comity decision to require an actual conflict between the laws of 
the U.S. and the state of the alleged abuse before considering dismissal 
204 SeeJota v. Texaco, Inc., 157 F.3d 153, 161 (2d Cir. 1998) (reversing district court's 
dismissal on international comity grounds absent a showing of an adequate alternate fo-
rum in the plaintiffs' state of Ecuador); Sa rei, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 1207 (refusing to dismiss 
plaintiffs' human rights claims under international comity doctrine); Canales l\Iartinez v. 
Dow Chemical Co., 219 F. Supp. 2d 719,731 (E.D. La. 2002) (refusing to dismiss claims by 
foreign banana workers against chemical company on fOTUm non cOllveniens grounds predi-
cated on international comity concerns); Bodner, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 129-30 (refusing to 
dismiss a case against French financial institutions for collusion with Nazi government on 
comity grounds because of nonexistence of French forum). 
205 See Doe v. U nocal Corp., 2002 "Vi.. 31063976, at *1 (9th Cir. 2002), reh'g en banc 
granted and opinion vacated, 2003 WL 359787, at *1 (9th Cir. 2003) (Nos. 00-56603, 00-
56608); Sarei, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 1207; Plaintiffs' Memo, supra note 8, at 32, Exxon (No. 01-
CV-1357). 
206 See In re Nazi Era Cases Against German Defendants Litigation, 129 F. Supp. 2d 370, 
386-88 (D.NJ. 2001) (dismissing case against German corporation and American subsidi-
aries for Nazi collusion on international comity grounds because of German Foundation 
law); Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp.2d 424, 490-91 (D.NJ. 1999) (dismissing 
claims by WWII forced laborers against Ford based on international comity because of a 
multilateral treaty stipulating that claims would be addressed out of court). 
207 See Corn, supra note 11, at 31. 
208 See Jota, 157 F.3d at 158-60; Sa rei, 221 F. Supp.2d at 1201, 1207; Bodner, 114 F. 
Supp. 2d at 130. 
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on comity grounds. 209 This threshold requirement, if employed in the 
future, would limit the dismissal of human rights cases to the rare in-
stances in which the state of the alleged rights abuse actually created a 
viable alternate remedy to U.S. courts for the plain tiffs, such as an in-
dependent statute or compensation fund. 210 Another court found the 
lack of such an alternative remedy, notwithstanding the controversial 
conflict of laws threshold requirement, to be a fatal deficiency in the 
defendant's international comity defense. 211 Yet another court reversed 
a dismissal on international comity grounds after the attorney general 
of the state of the alleged abuse intervened to argue the importance of 
human rights accountability in his country, although the court did not 
rely on the intervention in its explicit reasoning. 212 
Sarei also incorporated into its international comity analysis a po-
tentially far-reaching construction of the doctrine for human rights 
cases. 213 Although the court expressly declined to apply international 
comity to the plaintiffs' human rights claims because of the non-
existence of a conflict of laws, it also stated that public policy favored 
acljudication, notwithstanding the express foreign policy concerns ex-
pressed by the State Department. 214 In the court's words, "The fact that 
the conduct in which defendants engaged is alleged to constitute war 
crimes and crimes against humanity argues strongly in favor of the re-
tention of jurisdiction. "215 The court's refreshing deference to the im-
portance of human rights in international affairs is undermined some-
what by the oYerall holding of Sarci, which dismissed all claims under 
the political question doctrine.216 Nevertheless, this clear statement of 
the primacy of human rights over diplomatic, if not separation of pow-
209 Sec Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 798 (1993); Scmi. 221 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1201. 
210 Sec Sami, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 1201 (describing the PNG Compensation Act, which of-
fered redress for victims of em'ironmental harm stemming from mining); In rc Nazi Em 
Cases, 129 F. Supp.2d at 379, 387 (describing the U.S.-German Foundation Law, which 
offered individual payments to Nazi-era victims of German industry). 
211 Sec Bodner. 114 F. Supp. 2d at 130. 
212 See Iota. 157 F.3d at 158-60. 
213 Sec Sa rei. 221 F. Supp. 2d at 1207. 
214 See id. 
215 !d. 
216 Sec id. at 1195. Sarei's lengthy discussions of the international comity doctrine de-
spite its dismissal of all claims as political questions supports the inference that the judge 
intended to prm'ide a basis for future courts to adjudicate diplomatically-sensitive human 
rights cases in the face of the international comity defense. Sec id. at 1188,1207. 
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ers, concerns, is clearly progress.217 Future courts interested in uphold-
ing human rights values would do well to emulate this reasoning not 
only in their international comity analysis, but also in applying the act 
of state or political question doctrines in human righ ts cases.218 
The Restatement factors themselves, so often ignored in interna-
tional comity analysis, are conducive to Sarei's human rights-friendly 
approach to the doctrine. 219 Factor two, which counsels adjudication 
when there are close ties between the adjudicating state (the United 
States) and the entity responsible for the behavior in question (the 
MNC), weighs in favor of adjudication where U.S.-based MNCs are ac-
cused of rights abuse. 220 Factors three and five, which deal with the 
character of the activity to be regulated and its importance to the in-
ternational system, similarly favor adjudication when the activity in 
question is abhorrent and internationally-denounced human rights 
abuse.221 Factor four, which protects justified expectations that could be 
affected by adjudication, should not aid abusive corporations who 
might argue that they had expected to get away with abusive behavior 
because they relied on the weakness of domestic legal systems in the 
countries in which they maintained operations.222 Factor six-the ex-
tent to which regulation is consistent with international traditions-also 
leans toward adjudication in an era of increasing sensitivity to human 
rights values. 223 Although several other Restatement factors appear to fa-
vor dismissal, when coupled with the strong public policy interest in 
human rights accountability articulated in Sa rei, the above arguments 
217 See id. at 1207. If the court viewed human rights accountability as more important 
than the separation of powers, it would not have dismissed the human rights claims under 
the political question doctrine. See id. at 1195. 
218 See SaTei, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 1207. 
219 See supra note 54 and accompanying text. The Restatement factors are: (1) The link 
of the activity to the territory of the regulating state; (2) the connections, such as national-
ity, residence, or economic activity between the regulating state and the person principally 
responsible for the activity to be regulated; (3) the character of the activity to be regulated, 
the importance of regulation to the regulating state, the extent to which other states regu-
late such activities, and the degree to which the desirability of such regulation is generally 
accepted; (4) the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or hurt by the 
regulation; (5) the importance of the regulation to the international political, legal, or 
economic system; (6) the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the traditions of 
the international system; (7) the extent to which another state may have an interest in 
regulating the activity; and (8) the likelihood of conflict with regulation of another state. 
RESTATEMENT, supra note 52, § 403(2). 
220 See id. 
221 See id. 
222 See id. 
223 See id. 
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could certainly support a strong case for adjudicating human rights 
claims in the face of an international comity defense. 224 
Given the case history, the availability of a human rights-friendly 
interpretation of Supreme Court precedent, and Sarci's path-breaking 
statement of the importance of human rights accountability in interna-
tional comity analysis, this doctrine, like the act of state doctrine and, to 
a lesser extent, the political question doctrine, is an eminently sur-
mountable obstacle to corporate human rights adjudication. 
IV. EXECUTIVE INTERVENTION: BAD PUBLIC POLICY 
Part III of this Note demonstrates that the political question, act 
of state, and international comity doctrines are sufficiently flexible 
legal devices that they need not frustrate human rights plaintiffs.225 
Nevertheless, so long as the executive branch is willing to intervene 
on corporate defendants' behalf, the three doctrines will probably 
remain available as a defense strategy in human rights litigation.226 
This section buttresses the legal bases for rejecting the application of 
the judicial doctrines in corporate human rights cases by arguing that 
executive-corporate collusion is a hypocritical and ineffective public 
policy that is deleterious to U.S. interests, as well as the interests of 
human rights plaintiffs.227 
A. Setting a Trend 
Executive-corporate collusion threatens human rights plaintiffs for 
a number of reasons. First, because of a dramatic increase in ATCA 
corporate human rights litigation, a number of cases seeking to hold 
MNCs accountable for human rights abuses abroad face dismissal if the 
trend continues.228 Corporate defendants who have thus far sought 
dismissal on jurisdictional or forum non conveniens grounds will soon 
come to appreciate a strategy that provides an easy bar to adjudica-
tion.229 Indeed, the Unocal defendants' petition for a second executive 
opinion after the Clinton State Department was unavailing clearly 
224 See Sarei 221 F. Supp. 2d at 1207; REsTATEMF,NT, supra note 52, § 403(2). 
225 Sec discussion supra Part III. 
226 See discussion supra Part III.B. 
227 See discussion infra Part IV.B. 
228 See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Drummond Co., No. 02-CV-665 (N.D. AJa. filed Mar. 14, 
2002); Aldana v. Del l\Ionte Fresh Produce, Inc., No. 01-CV-3399 (S.D. Fla. filed Aug. 2, 
2001); Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., No. 01-CV-3208 (S.D. Fla. filedJuly 20,2001). 
229 Sec Efron, supra note 126, at 2. 
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demonstrates that corporate defendants have already caught on to the 
new trend. 230 
Second, contemporary cases will invariably influence the next 
generation of legal decision-makers.231 Judges will be bound by prece-
dent to the deference shown by higher courts to the executive branch. 
And future presidents, influenced by excessive notions of prerogative 
demonstrated by the Bush administration, could show even less solici-
tude for human rights lawsuits that interfere with their foreign policy 
agendas.232 Also, other governments in states otherwise committed to 
the rule of law could follow the example set by the United States, a self-
proclaimed human rights leader,233 and similarly intervene in private 
litigation to defeat embarrassing, but necessary, human rights claims. 
A third factor demonstrating the significance of executive-corp-
orate collusion is the executive branch's power to influence courts 
when it decides to intervene in sensitive lawsuits. The foreign rela-
tions defense presents intimidating and nearly irresistible grounds for 
dismissal to judges, who are often unfamiliar with foreign affairs and 
are wary of treading on the toes of the executive branch.234 For this 
reason, courts have tended to attach great significance to the opinion 
of the executive branch when it speaks on a lawsuit's propensity to 
affect the foreign relations of the United States.235 Indeed, Justice 
230 See id. 
231 See Girion, supra note 122, at 1. 
232 SeeWaldman & Mapes, supra note 5, at B1. 
233 See Testimony Before the Int'l Operations and Terrorism Subcomm., S. Foreign Relations 
Comm., Hearing on U.S. Human Rights Policy, 107th Congo (2001) (testimony of Paula Dobri-
an sky, Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs) (asserting that "[tlhroughout these 
years, our [the United States'] message has not wavered. Promoting democracy and pro-
tecting the individual against the excesses of the state is the policy of the United States," 
and quoting President Bush as saying "repressed people around the world must know this 
about the United States: We might not sit on some commission, but we will always be the 
world's leader in support of human rights"), available at http://www.state.gov/g/rls/ 
rm/2001/4134.htm (last visited Nov. 10,2003). 
234 See Sarei V. Rio Tin to PLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1198 (C.D. Cal. 2002). 
235 The complete history of cases in which the executive has interceded in diplomati-
cally-sensitive litigation is beyond the scope of this Note. Nonetheless, prominent cases 
reveal a breathtaking record of deference shown by judges to the executive branch. See, 
e.g., Kirkpatrick CO. V. Envt'l Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400, 408 (1990) (refusing to dismiss 
suit against corporation for collusion with corrupt Nigerian officials on act of state 
grounds, in part because of the State Department's recommendation in a letter to the 
district court); First Nat'l City Bank V. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 761 (1972) 
(reversing, for various reasons, two opinions by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals to 
allow a case by a U.S. bank against a Cuban bank for damages arising from expropriation 
after receiving letter from State Department advising that the act of state doctrine was not 
a bar); Banco Nacional de Cuba V. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 420 (1964) (reversing, pursu-
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Rehnquist, announcing the decision of a sharply-divided Supreme 
Court in First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, argued that 
courts must follow the executive branch's recommendation when it 
advises them not to apply the act of state doctrine in diplomatically-
sensitive lawsuits.236 Thus, the "persuasive power of executive commu-
nication," makes it all the more imperative that human rights advo-
cates impress upon the Bush administration the importance of aban-
doning its policy of intervening in lawsuits to frustrate human rights 
plain tiffs. 237 
ant to State Department's revised recommendation, lower court's denial of motion to dis-
miss on act of state doctrine, a claim involving the challenge to a Cuban expropriation 
decree); Doe v. Unocal Corp., 2002 WL 31063976, at *20-21 (9th Cir. 2002) (denying mo-
tion to dismiss per State Department's opinion that case against oil company for human 
rights abuse in Burma did not threaten U.S. foreign relations), Teh g en banc granted and 
opinion vacated, 2003 WL 359787, at *1 (9th Cir. 2003) (Nos. 00-56603, 00-56608); Kadic v. 
KaradZic, 70 F.3d 232, 250 (2d Cir. 1995) (denying motion to dismiss case against former 
Serbian president Radovan Karadiic on political question doctrine pursuant to State De-
partment's recommendation that the suit did not implicate foreign relations); Republic of 
the Philippines v. Marcos, 862 F.2d 1355, 1361 (9th Cir. 1988) (refusing to dismiss case 
against former president of the Philippines for corruption after State Department as ami-
cus foresaw no reason not to adjudicate), afl'd on this issue, Trajano v. Marcos, 878 F.2d 
1439, **2 (9th Cir. 1989); Allied Bank Intern v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 757 
F.2d 516, 518-19 (2d Cir. 1985) (reversing court's own dismissal on act of state grounds 
after the post-decision intervention of the Justice Department as amicus curiae; the Justice 
Department urged adjudication of the case, in which three state-owned Costa Rican banks 
defaulted on payments to a syndicate of American banks); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 
876, 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (allowing a case involving violations of international human rights 
law to proceed after a Justice Department amicus brief pressed for the same); Bernstein v. 
N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-Maatschappij, 210 F.2d 375, 375-76 (2d 
Cir. 1954) (reversing dismissal of case against Dutch company for economic collusion with 
Nazi party pursuant to a letter by the State Department's Legal Adviser); Sarei, 221 F. 
Supp.2d at 1196-98 (dismissing, pursuant to State Department's recommendation, suit 
against mining corporation for human rights abuses in Papua New Guinea). 
236 Sec 406 U.S. at 768. The plurality's stance on what is known as the Bernstein Excep-
tion involved a situation in which the act of state doctrine seemingly barred adjudication, 
but the executive requested adjudication nonetheless. See id.; see also Lowenfeld, supra note 
9, at 796-801. Since First National City, the Court has clarified that courts need not take the 
executive's recommendation, but the case history suggests that courts still attach great 
significance to the executive's opinion. See Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 
363, 386 (2000) (stating that collected statements by the executive were "more than 
sufficient" to demonstrate a statute's incompatibility with U.S. foreign policy); Envt'l Tecton-
ics, 847 F.2d 1052, 1062 (3d Cir. 1988) (stating that the State Department's findings offact 
regarding a lawsuit's ability to frustrate its diplomatic aims are entitled to substantial re-
spect), afl'd 493 U.S. 400 (1988). But see Kadic. 70 F.3d at 250 (announcing that the execu-
th'e's argument for dismissal in political question cases does not preclude adjudication, but 
is nonetheless entitled to respectful consideration). 
237 See Free, Sltpra note 14, at 473. 
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B. Public Policy and the ildjudication of Sensitive Claims 
Executive-corporate collusion is subject to policy criticism on 
many fronts. 238 It sacrifices accountability for rights abusers for politi-
cal and economic gain, undermining human rights policy goals and 
values in the process.239 Executive intervention is also short-sighted in 
its reckless contribution to anti-Americanism in the developing world, 
a major security concern since the attacks of September 11, 2001.240 
In short, upon in-depth examination, the policy is indefensible.241 
1. Ineffective Human Rights Policy 
The Bush administration has argued that long-term human rights 
goals support its recent interventions in diplomatically-sensitive human 
rights cases.242 "Big picture" human rights policy, according to this ar-
gument, requires dismissing lawsuits that could interfere with broader 
U.S. diplomatic efforts geared toward increasing human rights sensitiv-
ity abroad.243 For instance, in Sara, the State Department argued that 
only by dismissing the case at bar, which was embarrassing to the PNG 
government, could the United States allow PNG to continue to advance 
its politically fragile peace process; a verdict against the government 
could have jeopardized its decision to withdraw troops from Bougain-
ville.244 The State Department made a similar appeal on behalf of the 
defendant in Ex:<:on, arguing that adjudication would undercut U.S. 
pressure for military and judicial reform in Indonesia and could lead 
Indonesia to partner with businesses from states with poor human 
rights records. 245 Thus executive-corporate collusion raises an impor-
tant human rights policy question: does adjudicating diplomatically-
sensitive cases better serve human rights goals than engagement with 
abusive regimes?246 
A number of arguments support the view that executive-corporate 
collusion ultimately harms the current movement toward greater re-
spect for human rights worldwide. First, engagement coupled with ac-
countability is a more effective diplomatic answer to abusive regimes 
238 See discussion infra Parts IV.B.I-2. 
239 See discussion infra Part IV.B.I. 
240 See discussion infra Part IV.B.2. 
241 Seediscussion ilifra Parts IV.B.I-2. 
242 See Sarei Letter, supra note 8, at 2. 
243 See id. 
244 See id. 
245 See Exxon Letter, supra note I, at 3. 
246 See id. 
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than blind engagement.247 By the State Department's own admission, 
states that partner with MNCs cannot reach human rights goals until 
they effectively put a stop to rights abuses by their security services.248 
Yet in Exxon, for instance, the Department, in claiming to seek an end 
to the Indonesian military's abuses through engagement while ignor-
ing accountability for past abuse, presumed that an end to the years-
old Aceh conflict would instantly transform an abusive military and a 
government inured to rights abuse into a model regime. 249 The lack 
of human rights progress despite close U.S.-Indonesia ties during the 
brutal Suharto dictatorship undercuts such an assumption, as do a 
number of other instances where uncritical engagement with abusive 
regimes has failed to stem human rights abuses-in post-gill China 
and Uzbekistan, for instance, to cite just two contemporary exam-
ples.250 Engagement must include accountability as a disincentive to 
continued rights abuse in order to succeed in creating a rights-
sensitive military and government.251 
247 See Human Rights Watch, Powell Should Urge Accountability by Indonesian Afilitary 
(2002) [hereinafter Powell Should Urge Accountability), available at http://hrw.org/press 
/2002/07/indo0731.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 2003). As Human Rights Watch has re-
ported, the administration's intervention on behalf of the defendant in Exxon came at the 
very moment the U.S. resumed direct military cooperation with the notorious Indonesian 
military. See Bush Backtracks, supra note SS. 
248 Exxon Letter, supra note 1, at 2 (stating that "a lasting, peaceful solution to the 
Aceh conflict that maintains Indonesian sovereignty can only be achieved if the military 
and police end human rights abuses"). 
249 See Human Rights Watch, The Indonesian Military and Ongoing Abuses (2002), avail-
able at http://hrw.org//backgrounder/asia/ indo-bck0702.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 2003). 
250 See ,",Valter LaFeber, The Post September 11 Debate 01le1' Empire, Globalization, and Frag-
1IIentation, 117 POL. SCI. Q. I, 16 (2002) (arguing that U.S. engagement 'with China after 
September 11 has focused on terrorism cooperation to the expense of all other diplomatic 
goals, including human rights); Accountable Aid: U.S. Foreign Military Assistance and Human 
Rights, FOREIGN POL'y, July I, 2002, at 14 (stating that 51 of ISO states receiving military 
aid from the U.S. have been identified by the State Department as having "poor" human 
rights records); William F. Schulz, Q: Has the White House Ignored Human-Rights in the Name 
of National Security 1 Yes: The Administration Has Given Itself and Its Coalition Partners a 'Pass' on 
Human Rights Violations, INSIGHT ON NEWS, July 15, 2002, at 41 (recounting the U.S.'s 
abysmal record of securing human rights improvements despite engagement, including on 
human rights issues, with the governments of Russia, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Columbia, 
Malaysia, and Kazakstan); Robert Templer, Steppe Back, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. IS & 25, 2003, 
at 11-13 (arguing that the U.S.'s unquestioning support of Uzbekistan's President, Islam 
Karimov, in return for strategic basing rights for use in the war on terror has stymied prog-
ress on the country's terrible human rights situation); Powell Should Urge Accountability, 
supra note 247. Engagement where the actual goal is human rights reform stands a chance 
of success; unfortunately, human rights is often a politically risk-free fa~ade for other dip-
lomatic concessions-recently, cooperation in the war on terror. See Schulz, supra, at 41. 
251 See Schulz, supra note 250, at 41. 
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Second, the Bush administration's casual willingness to sacrifice 
human rights plaintiffs calls into question the sincerity of its stated goal 
of achieving human rights progress in the developing world in the first 
place.252 The State Department mentioned the human rights implica-
tions of adjudication in its letters in both Sara and Exxon, but the ex-
ecutive's true concerns were more likely political and economic in na-
ture.253 For instance, in the State Department's letter to the judge in 
Exxon, the human rights implications of adjudication were awkwardly 
lumped among the broader concerns of losing opportunities for U.S. 
invesunent in Indonesia and jeopardizing a critical alliance in the war 
on terror, arguments of dubious merit in their own right.254 Similarly, 
critics have accused the administration of urging dismissal in Sarei out 
of support for the mining industry, not because of a concern for long-
term human rights policymaking.255 If human rights progress is not in 
fact the U.S. foreign policy interest in preventing acljudication in cor-
porate human rights cases, experience shows that human rights con-
cerns are likely to remain un-addressed. 256 
Third, executive intervention in corporate human rights cases un-
dermines the United States' commitment to human rights, especially in 
the eyes of indigenous plaintiffs who lay their hopes for institutional 
redress in U.S. courts.257 Despite the inadequacies of the United States 
252 See Exxon Letter, supm note I, at 3. 
253 See id.; Sarei Letter, supra note 8, at 2. Indeed, a contemporaneous diplomatic visit 
to Indonesia by Secretary of State Colin Powell reinforces the suspicion of many human 
rights pundits that the Bush administration is able and willing to allow adjudication of 
sensitive cases when such cases serve American economic interests. See Bush Backtracks, 
supra note 88. When asked by Indonesia's foreign minister about an unrelated lawsuit 
brought by two U.S. firms against Indonesia's state energy firm, Powell reportedly stated 
that U.s. foreign policy does not involve interfering in private lawsuits. See id. 
254 See Exxon Letter, supra note 1, at 3-5; see also Murray Hiebert & John McBeth, Cal-
culating Human Rights, FAR E. EcoN. REV., Aug. 15, 2002, at 18. Indonesia experts have 
emphasized the improbability of the Indonesian ambassador's threats to cut off lucrative 
government contracts for American businesses. See Hiebert & McBeth, supm, at 19. Indo-
nesia has become economically dependant on the United States; the State Department's 
letter even portrays the Indonesian economy as so fragile as to be on the point of collapse 
without investment. See id.; Roth, supra note 2, at 4. The fear that IndonesLo, would recon-
sider its support for the U.S. war on terror if its demand for a dismissal was denied was 
similarly unfounded. See Oily Diplomacy, supm note 79, at A16. Indonesia has long strug-
gled with radical Muslim terrorism and would almost certainly not have forgone its strate-
gic allLo,nce with the United States for the small victory of making an embarrassing lawsuit 
disappear. See Roth, supra note 2, at 4. 
255 See Oily Diplomacy, supra note 79, at A16. 
256 See supra note 253. 
257 See William Glaberson, U.S. Courts Become A.rbiters of Global Rights and Wrongs, N.Y. 
TIMEs,June 21, 2001, at AI. 
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as a permanent forum for international human rights litigation, It IS 
nonetheless an attractive option to plaintiffs in the developing world, 
both because of procedural mechanisms such as punitive damages and 
jury trials, and because of unresponsive legal systems at home.258 The 
administration's vainglorious human rights rhetoric, coupled with its 
unabashed pursuit of U.S. interests over human rights accountability, 
sends a message of hypocrisy to the international community.259 The 
damage of such a statement on U.S. credibility abroad outweighs any 
marginal economic and political gains secured by sacrificing human 
rights accountability.260 
Rather than a long-term solution to human rights abuse abroad, 
executive-corporate collusion is a short-cut that sacrifices human rights 
values as expendable bargaining chips for short-term political and eco-
nomic gain.261 As the next section demonstrates, executive-corporate 
collusion is also a misguided foreign policy that jeopardizes long-term 
U.S. in terests. 262 
2. Short-Sighted Foreign Policy 
Executive intervention in diplomatically-sensitive lawsuits is also a 
disingenuous and ineffective foreign policy.263 Past executive interven-
tionsshow that the executive branch is quite willing to allow domestic 
lawsuits to effect its foreign policy goals when it is convenient to do 
SO.264 Further, intervening in corporate human rights cases breeds re-
sentment abroad, because of perceived double-standards in American 
human rights policy and corporate responsibility rhetoric. 265 Fanning 
the flames of anti-Americanism for so little gain is an ill-considered 
policy choice that ultimately is at odds with U.S. interests.266 
Current267 and past administrations have conducted foreign policy, 
and even human rights policy, through U.S. courts in the past when it 
258 See Slaughter & Bosco, supra note 134, at 102. 
259 See Roth, supra note 2, at 4. 
260 See Hiebert & McBeth, supra note 254, at 19 (reporting that Indonesia specialists 
dispute the assertion that Indonesia, with its economic woes and historic dependence on 
U.S. foreign direct investment, was in a position to abandon ties with U.S. multinationals if 
adjudication were allowed). 
261 See Oily Diplomacy, supra note 79, at A16. 
262 See discussion infra Part IV.B.2. 
263 See McGrory, supra note 87, at A31. 
264 See infra notes 267-274 and accompanying text. 
265 See infra notes 275-278 and accompanying text. 
266 See Schulz, supra note 250, at 41. 
267 See supra note 253. 
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was expedient to do so.268 In a 1985 case before the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit, the Reagan administration intervened in 
an appellate hearing to argue that the dismissal of a suit brought by a 
syndicate of American banks against Costa Rican banks for recovery of 
outstanding monies should be reversed.269 The executive argued that 
the district court had misapplied U.S. public policy by dismissing the 
case under the act of state doctrine. 270 To the executive, securing debt 
repayment for U.S. banks outweighed any concern over the separation 
of powers or diplomatic niceties.271 Similarly, when former Serbian 
President Radovan Karadzic raised a political question defense in a war-
crimes suit, the State Department wrote two letters, including one with 
the support of the Attorney General and Solicitor General, emphati-
cally stating that adjudication of his case would not adversely impact 
U.S. foreign relations.272 The Clinton administration, while wary that 
the lawsuit could strain ongoing Balkan peace negotiations, nonethe-
less decided to endorse the suit as a means of distinguishing itself from 
past Republican administrations on the subject of human rights, ac-
cording to a State Department memorandum.273 While in these two 
instances, the executive's foreign policy objectives warranted adjudicat-
ing diplomatically-sensitive lawsuits, improving the human rights rec-
ords of developing states, without more, apparently does not rise to 
such importance for the Bush administration.274 
In addition to the anti-American resentment fostered by duplici-
tous human rights policy, executive-corporate collusion creates an addi-
tional basis for resentment abroad in the arena of corporate responsi-
bility.275 The State Department's letter arguing for dismissal of Exxon 
was written not three weeks after President Bush declared that "Amer-
ica's greatest economic need is higher ethical standards," and that 
"there is no capitalism without conscience."276 The administration's 
268 See Human Rights and Terror, WASH. POST, Aug. 10, 2002, at A18 ("The State De-
partment's real objection to the Exxon Mobil suit is that it doesn't think courts are the 
right place to make foreign policy.") 
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outrageous willingness to support severe corporate malfeasance abroad 
so soon after pledging to embark upon a new era of responsibility leads 
to the impression that American companies are only responsible "to 
the water's edge."277 This double-standard invites resentment against 
the United States by suggesting to indigenous plaintiffs that corporate 
accountability, the height of America's concern for domestic businesses 
at the time of both the Exxon and Sarei interventions, is an unnecessary 
bother for American businesses operating in the developing world.278 
The resentment and anger engendered by U.S. hypocrisy on Im-
man rights policy and corporate responsibility are antithetical to long-
term U.S. interests, and represent an immediate security threat in an 
age of global terrorism.279 As the U.S. has become entrenched in the 
Middle East, an area of the world currently saturated by virulent anti-
Americanism, its perception abroad has increasingly become a matter 
of national security policy.280 As one prominent human rights leader 
has noted, "Human rights are the foundation of national security, both 
domestically and around the world."281 Flagrant inconsistency between 
U.S. rhetoric and practice abroad provides anti-American extremists 
and terrorists with an invaluable propaganda tool for adding angry re-
cruits to their ranks. 282 Because such antagonism is eminently prevent-
able, U.S. double standards on human rights and corporate account-
ability represent a clear foreign policy failure.283 
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CONCLUSION 
The new trend of executive-corporate collusion to dismiss diplo-
matically-sensitive corporate human rights lawsuits is troubling on many 
fronts. The trend evidences a startling lack of concern for human rights 
values in the United States' foreign policy, which is inconsistent with 
the Bush administration's frequent invocation of human rights values. 
The trend also points to hypocritical policy enforcement abroad in 
terms of corporate responsibility. Further, executive-corporate collusion 
is a tenuous legal maneuver, given the adaptability of all three judicial 
doctrines discussed in this Note to "human-rights friendly" application. 
Rather than intervene for political and economic gain, the ex-
ecutive branch should allow human rights cases that embarrass for-
eign sovereigns to run their course. If the allegations of the lawsuits 
are without merit, corporate defendants can adequately defend their 
interests without the help of the executive branch.284 In cases where 
corporations are in fact guilty of complicity in human rights abuse, 
the parties have the option to settle outside of court, which could 
mitigate any diplomatic ramifications of the dispute. 285 Above all, 
where corporate defendants are guilty of complicity in human rights 
abuse abroad, their shameful and exploitative acts must be exposed, 
redressed, and stopped. 
A resolution to the increased use of the political question, inter-
national comity, and head of state doctrines will not, however, resolve 
the difficulties inheren t in MNC liability in U.S. courtS.286 Other pro-
cedural and jurisdictional requirements still make the adjudication of 
claims under the ATCA, for instance, less, rather than more, likely.287 
Consistent accountability for rights abusers will require a series of 
deeper, structural changes to the international regime of human 
rights protections.288 Binding standards for corporate conduct abroad 
are one example.289 A U.S. commitment to the International Criminal 
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Court is another.290 And it is conceivable that in some instances, long-
term human rights goals, if doggedly pursued, could theoretically 
outweigh short-term adjudication of past abuse, in which case human 
rights-conscious policymakers would face a difficult choice between 
absolutes. 291 
ATCA litigation in U.S. courts, however, is one of the only avail-
able solutions to the problem of unchecked corporate human rights 
violations abroad.292 Because of executive-corporate collusion, that 
solution is perilously close to losing any vestige of effectiveness.293 Un-
til the international community can realize an international human 
rights framework that holds accountability for rights abuse above 
dated notions of sovereign prerogative, plaintiffs, in the interest of 
justice, should have their day in U.S. courtS.294 
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